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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most well known economic trend in the 1990s is the
exponential growth of international trade and foreign investment.' A
1. Foreign Direct Investment in a Global Economy, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1989,
at 32; James E. Ellis, Why Overseas? 'Cause That's Where the Sales Are. Bus. WK.,
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recent snapshot of the U.S. economy provides the most striking exam-
ple of the tremendous flow of goods and money crossing American bor-
ders. United States merchandise exports grew tenfold between 1970 and
1992 to $448.2 billion.2 From 1987 to 1992, U.S. direct investment over-
seas rose 35%, to $776 billion, exceeding foreign direct investment in
the United States by $84 billion in 1992.'
The increasing importance of foreign markets is exhibited on the
micro-economic level as well. Foreign direct investment by United
States corporations increased dramatically in recent years, and as a re-
sult, more and more domestic firms receive their income from abroad.'
Overseas subsidiaries of U.S. corporations generate sales representing
about three times the value of all U.S. exports.' General Electric's light-
ing division, for example, earned more than forty percent of its 1993
sales outside the United States.'
This trend is driven in part by the growing scarcity of economic op-
portunities at home, but also by the birth of new markets abroad. The
economic and political rebirths of Eastern Europe, Latin American, and
South East Asia have opened doors to vast populations of eager con-
sumers.7 In response, both large and small corporations in the United
States are venturing abroad, vis-a-vis branch offices, foreign wholly-
owned subsidiaries, or joint ventures incorporated in foreign countries.'
Jan. 10, 1994, at 62; Thomas A. Stewart, Te New Era; Welcome to the Revolution,
FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1993, at 66. For a detailed account of world trade and foreign di-
rect investment figures see generally Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, OECD
ECON. OUTLOOK, June 1992, at 35.
2. Ellis, supra note 1, at 62.
3. Stewart, supra note 1, at 66.
4. Id. One recent example of aggressive movement overseas of U.S. corporations
is Anheuser-Busch's purchase of a 5% stake in China's Tsingtao brewery. Anheuser-
Busch to Buy 5-percent Stake in China's Tsingtao Brewery, BUs. WIRE, June 28,
1993. August A. Busch I1, chairman and president of Anheuser-Busch, noted that the
move has "significant strategic importance for our international business efforts be-
cause of the rapid growth and enormous potential of the Chinese beer market." Id.
5. Stewart, supra note 1, at 66.
6. Id.
7. Id.; Albert Fishlow, Latin America TransJbrmed: An Accounting, NEW PERSP.
Q., Fall 1993, at 19. The move to Latin America has already begun. During 1991 and
1992, capital flowing to this region exceeded that flowing out by more than $50 bil-
lion. Id. at 19. This represents more than the total net flow from 1983 to 1989. Id.
8. See Glenn R. Sarno, Htaling Foreign Subsidiary Corporations into Court Under
the 1934 Act: Jurisdictional Bases and Foram Non Conveniens, 55 LAW & CONTEMI'.
PROBS. 379, 381 (Autumn 1992) (discussing the legal and non-legal consideration guid-
ing U.S. corporations to establish subsidiaries abroad).
These subsidiaries in turn either reexport their products to other for-
eign markets or take advantage of the domestic market where they
reside.'
An additional impetus for foreign investment is the birth of free trade
areas, such as that established by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which will encourage trade in goods and. capital not just
between the United States and Mexico,'" but throughout all of Latin
America."
As goods and financial assets cross the United States border with
increasing frequency, so does the long-arm of United States law. This is
especially the case with federal antitrust law in which the government
interest in regulating anticompetitive activity overseas is most compel-
ling.'2 In introducing the International Fair Competition Act of 1993,"'
Senator Metzenbaum explained one of the primary goals of internation-
al antitrust enforcement:
[Although] we cannot impose our high regard for fair competition on the rest of
the world .... [we can] help encourage fairness and strong competition in interna-
tional markets by preventing foreign companies based in countries that do not
foster free and open competition from exploiting American consumers and pro-
ducers."
The focus of the Clinton Administration on international enforcement
was evidenced by Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman, who called
it one of the Antitrust Division's top priorities."
Resolving the conflicts arising out of the enforcement of United States
laws governing foreign conduct falls ultimately to United States courts.
Although determining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law is only a mat-
ter of statutory construction," most federal statutes are silent or give
only cryptic clues as to their scope.'7 Judges, therefore, have formulated
9. See id.
10. Mexico is already the United States' third largest trading partner. NAFTA Facts,
Bus. AM., Oct. 18, 1993, at 31. In 1992, U.S. exports to Mexico increased 22%, but
they only grew by 5% to the rest of the world. Id.
11. Fishlow. supra note 7, at 19. In addition to Mexico. as of 1990 six other coun-
tries have negotiated bilateral framework agreements with the United States. These
nations are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Honduras. Id.
12. See iitfra notes 196. 418-35, 451-70.
13. S. 99, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
14. 139 CONG. REC. S195-02, S534 (1993) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
15. Bingaman Details Division Priorities in International Antitrust Enforcement, 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 568 (Oct. 28, 1993).
16. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded
by statute, as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 591 (2d ed. 1992).
17. The Sherman Act, the mainstay of antitrust law, prohibits conduct in "restraint
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their own federal common law rules to decipher the intended reach of
various statutes. " As U.S. business has expanded globally, these juris-
dictional rules have changed significantly during their 200-year history.
During the nineteenth century, the courts, in accord with then-prevailing
notions of international law, severely limited the reach of U.S. law to
conduct that occurred in U.S. territory. ' But with the growing power
and complexity of business organizations in the twentieth century, the
nation's regulatory needs also increased."' As a result, courts have aban-
doned the nineteenth century territorial approach in favor of analyses
that, like the business organizations they regulate, do not limit them-
selves to the national borders.' Thus, courts have readily adopted an
expansive approach in areas of antitrust, securities, and certain export
regulations.'
Despite the logical progression of these jurisdictional rules, their stan-
dards remained unpredictable and were not uniformly applied among the
of trade'or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Although the Act does not specifically
define the boundaries of its extraterritorial reach, it defines commerce as commerce
"among the several States, or with foreign nations." Id. This broad language has been
repeatedly interpreted to indicate that Congress intended the Act to apply to both do-
mestic and foreign conduct. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280. 289 (1952);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am.. 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. Margaret V. Sachs, The Intcrnational Reach of Rule lOb-5: The Myth of Con-
gressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 681-82 (1990) (arguing that when
Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, it was aware of the international
nature of securities markets, and thus the protection of those Acts should be limited
to domestic trade).'
19. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 2-54 (1992) (exploring in detail the historical progression
of legislative jurisdiction of U.S. law).
20. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1968); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 290 (1949); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909), overruled by United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 574.
21. Born, supra note 19, at 1.
22. One example of the modern approach is the judicially created 'effects doc-
trine," which allows extraterritorial application of U.S. law when the defendant's con-
duct abroad has had a substantial and foreseeable effect within the United States. See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 16, at 591-92.
23. See generally Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310 (1985) (discussing the extraterri-
torial reach of antitrust, securities and foreign trade controls).
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federal circuits. For example, although courts have universally adopted
an expansive view in the antitrust arena, in other seemingly important
areas, such as environmental or employment law, the courts have adopt-
ed a far more restrictive view by presuming that the law was intended to
apply only within United States territory." In addition, even with respect
to antitrust law, where there is apparent consensus, there is still dis-
agreement among several circuits on the proper scope of the applicable
legal standard."5
The resulting problems caused by unpredictable and ambiguous rules
are clear. To the business community, uncertainty wrecks havoc on ef-
fective business planning." To the international community, such far
reaching and unpredictable rules are repugnant to stable foreign rela-
tions. Extraterritorial application of one nation's law to conduct that oc-
curs entirely within another nation violates the most fundamental tenets
of territorial sovereignty. 7 Frictions arise when a foreign government
entity usurps the power of the domestic regulatory agency to regulate
activity within its own borders.' In response to the intrusive nature of
United States regulatory interests, foreign governments retaliate by apply-
ing their law extraterritorially to entities located in the United States.
Foreign courts may also retaliate by refusing to recognize U.S. judgments
that might be enforced within their borders.' Other more drastic mea-
sures, such as secrecy laws or blocking statutes, can be erected by for-
24. See generally Born, supra note 19. at 54-59; Harry H. Almond, The Extratei-r-
torial Reach of United States Regulatory Authority over the Environmental Impacts
of Its Activities, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 739 (1980).
25. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 597-98. For instance, courts in determining
the legitimate reach of U.S. law, commonly disagree on what constitutes a cognizable
"effect" on United States commerce. See infra notes 21440 and accompanying text.
26. Deana Conn, Note, Assessing the Impact qf Areferential Trade Agreements and
New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to Interna-
tionatl Mergers, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 170 (1993).
27. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 601.
28. JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUIST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD §§ 4.01-.19 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1993).
29. See Sarno supra note 8, at 397 n.t16 (explaining the failure of the United
States and Great Britain to establish a more liberal recognition of each others' judg-
ments); British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem Indus., [1953] Ch. 19, 26 (de-
claring that an order of a United States court enforcing an antitrust decree by enjoin-
ing the English defendant from performing its contracts to assign to English plaintiffs
exclusive manufacturing and marketing rights is "an assertion of an extraterritorial
jurisdiction which we do not recognize.")
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eign legislatures to make the discovery of the activities of domestic inter-
ests impossible.'
Recognizing the difficulties created by far-reaching application of Unit-
ed States law, federal courts have more recently sought solutions such as
presuming territoriality, or engaging in a balancing of interests between
nations."' In addition, the executive branch has negotiated several bilat-
eral treaties to reduce international tension by reconciling conflicting
regulatory obligations and agreeing to certain terms of cooperation in en-
forcement.' However, none of these approaches has achieved the de-
gree of certainty or predictability sought by the international communi-
ty.M'
This Comment examines the problem of extraterritorial reach of Unit-
ed States law, otherwise known as legislative jurisdiction. As a prelimi-
nary discussion, Part II provides an overview of the common jurisdiction-
al issues presented when one of the parties before the court is a foreign
corporation.' This is a necessary precursor since questions of judicial
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens and venue, are generally raised in
30. Both secrecy laws and blocking statutes make it a crime for a requested party
to respond to a foreign discovery request. BORN & WESTIN, supr a note 16, at 602-03.
Legislation may also quash the coercive effect of foreign regulations by retroactively
restoring the civil penalties paid by the defendant corporation. The Protection of
Trading Interests Act, enacted by Great Britain in 1980 largely in response to the
United States' extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws, is an example of such
legislation. The "Clawback Act" enables British corporations to recover all or part of
anti-trust treble damage awards. See The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.
11, § 6; Erika Nijenhuis, Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce:
Suggestions for Procedural Reform; 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1987).
31. For a discussion of these types of cases, see Russell J. Weintraub, The Extra-
territorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility
of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992); Note, supra note 23, at
1310 (criticizing the balancing of interests analysis approach adopted by § 403 of the
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law); see also discussion infra notes 250-301
and accompanying text.
32. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 632 (noting the United States has signed
four recent agreements regarding antitrust enforcement with the European Communi-
ty, Australia. Canada, and West Germany, respectively); Seung Wha Chang, Extraterri-
torial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilat-
eral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts Within the Pacific Community,
16 HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L. REV. 295, 309-19 (1993) (proposing model treaties of
antitrust enforcement). For further discussion of these agreements see discussion
infra notes 437-50 and accompanying text.
33. See Note, supra note 23, at 1318.
34. See infra notes 39-154 and accompanying text.
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conjunction with the defense of lack of legislative jurisdiction, and there-
fore are indirect limitations on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law.
Moreover, the tests adopted by courts concerning judicial jurisdiction
often involve the same elements used in the legislative jurisdictional anal-
ysis. Part III focuses on legislative jurisdiction in particular, giving a
historical overview of its progression to the present day."' Part IV then
looks historically at the legislative jurisdictional rules in the area of anti-
trust law.:' This part also examines the most recent pronouncements to-
wards extraterritorial antitrust from the Supreme Court, Congress, and
the Justice Department, and includes the current debate among scholars
and courts as to whether notions of international comity should limit the
reach of U.S. antitrust law. Part V explores the various solutions pro-
posed by modem legal scholars, including treaty based solutions to the
legislative jurisdictional problem. 7 Finally, Part VI concludes this Com-
ment by arguing in favor of a legislative solution which would compel
courts to presume extraterritorial jurisdiction because this is the best
way to ensure predictability for the international community without
interfering with the legitimate reach of U.S. antitrust law.'
II. U.S. COURTS' JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
In an attempt to provide a context for the discussion of jurisdictional
issues, this part introduces three common international business scenari-
os and analyzes the jurisdictional issues arising from them.
Scenario one: A U.S. parent corporation that establishes a branch
office, wholly owned subsidiary, or joint-venture in a foreign country.
Scenario two: A foreign-based parent corporation that establishes a
branch office, wholly owned subsidiary, or joint-venture within the
U.S..
Scenario three: A foreign corporation is headquartered abroad with ab-
solutely no presence in the United States, except perhaps the inciden-
tal presence of its goods or services.
35. See infra notes 155-95 and accompanying text.
36. See ifra notes 196-435 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 436-94 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 495-507 and accompanying text.
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In each scenario, the issue of legislative jurisdiction is clear: Can U.S.
law permissibly proscribe the conduct of that part of the entity located
overseas? The simple answer in all three scenarios is "yes." Depending
on the factual circumstances of the case, U.S. law will apply to the con-
duct of these entities even though they are situated outside U.S. territo-
ry. 3o
However, these scenarios raise other important jurisdictional issues.
Notwithstanding the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, does a U.S. court
have the power to assert in personam jurisdiction over the foreign
entity in the dispute? If so, are there other reasons the court would de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction?
The impact that the resolution of these issues has on legislative juris-
diction is twofold. First, because they go to the power of the court even
to hear the dispute, they may preempt the application of U.S. law before
legislative jurisdiction is discussed. Second, the analyses adopted by U.S.
courts to resolve different jurisdictional issues are often the same and
highly interrelated. Thus, the arguments used to support a court's judicial
jurisdiction are often the same arguments used to support legislative
jurisdiction. Because of the important impact other jurisdictional issues
may have on the legislative jurisdiction analysis, a brief discussion of
these issues as applied to the above corporate scenarios is necessary.
A. In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporate Defendants
First, it is possible under any of the three scenarios that the U.S. court
will be unable to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the corporate
defendant, in which case the foreign entity will be free from the applica-
tion of U.S. law." A court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction
unless permitted by both the applicable long-arm statute and the United
States Constitution."
39. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
40. In personam jurisdiction is "the power of the court to adjudicate a claim
against the defendant's person and to render a judgment enforceable against the de-
fendant and any of its assets." BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 28. By contrast,
legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction is the authority of a state to make its laws gen-
erally applicable to persons or activities. Id. at 27. A third type of jurisdiction, "'en-
forcement jurisdiction,' . . . is the authority of a state to induce or compel compli-
ance, or punish noncompliance with its laws." Id.
41. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 28-34: 2 JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.41-1[4] (2d ed. 1993); 1 PIIILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TIJRNER.
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND TIIEIR APPLICATION 235,
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1. Applicable Long-Arm Statute
Assuming the action is brought in a federal court," Rule 4 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure directs federal courts to use the service
provisions contained in any applicable federal statute,"' or to "borrow"
the long-arm statute enacted by the state in which the federal court is
located."' For example, federal antitrust and securities laws have service
provisions allowing for service "wherever the defendant may be found or
transacts business."' This provision is generally interpreted to authorize
"worldwide" service of process. Absent a service provision in the appli-
cable statute, courts are required, in both diversity and federal question
cases, to adopt the long-arm statute of the state in which they are locat-
ed.47 Most modem state long-arm statutes are open ended, allowing ser-
at 256-60 (1978 & Supp. 1992); ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
§ 3.02[1] (2d ed. 1991).
42. Suits brought under federal antitrust laws fall under the federal courts' federal
question jurisdiction. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16. at 543; see also U.S. CONST. art.
III (granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases "arising under . . . the Laws of
the United States").
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e) & 4(f).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Rule 4(e) provides:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides . . . for service of a summons . . . upon a party not an inhab-
itant of or found within the state . . . service may . . . be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988) (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. §77v (1988) (federal securities
laws); 2 MOORE, supr. note 41, 4.33 (2d ed. 1988); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16,
at 99-100. Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant,
but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and
all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988).
46. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989);
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 99. Other statutes are limited to "nationwide" ser-
vice within the United States. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1988) (RICO)).
47. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1987) (holding
that when the terms of the Louisiana long-arm statute were not met, service of pro-
cess was unauthorized pursuant to FRCP 4(e)). Federal courts are bound by state
court decisions in interpreting state long-arm statutes. See Chandler v. Barclays Bank
PLC, 898 F.2d 1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 1990); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 1980); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Ex-
press Co., 556 F.2d 406. 415 (9th Cir. 1977); George v. Strick Corp., 496 F.2d 10, 13
(10th Cir. 1974). But see United Rope Distrib. Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930
F.2d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that although the Wisconsin long-arm statute
permits jurisdiction, the due process clause precludes it because the defendant had
1228
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vice to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution.4 The language
in some statutes, however, limits their reach to non-residents "engage[d]
in business" in the state." A third set of statutes specifies in exhaustive
detail a "laundry list" of circumstances in which personal jurisdiction can
be asserted over non-resident defendants.' Nonetheless, all such stat-
utes extend jurisdiction to foreign corporations "transacting business" in
the forum state."1
Assuming that the applicable long-arm statute permits service of pro-
cess on the foreign corporate defendant, the assertion of jurisdiction
must also be consistent with due process, as discussed below.
2. General Jurisdiction
A court's judicial jurisdiction is typically broken into two categories:
(1) "general" jurisdiction and (2) "limited" or "specific" jurisdiction. 2 If a
plaintiff asserts general jurisdiction, the court may adjudicate any claim
against the defendant, even if the claim arises out of activities unrelated
to the forum.' General jurisdiction is ordinarily asserted when the de-
fendant corporations are incorporated or registered to do business in the
state.' A second basis for general jurisdiction is when the defendant
engages in "continuous and systematic" activities in the forum.' General
no contacts with the state).
48. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-209 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. 4:4-4(e) (1988).
49. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., 4(e)(2) (1973 & Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634-35 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.633 & 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1993); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
50. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 9.05.-15 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193 (West 1968); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (1982 & Supp. 1993); MIctI. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.705 &
600.715 (West 1981); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R § 302(a) (McKinney 1990); W. VA. CODE
§ 56-3-33 (1990 Supp.).
51. See CASAD, supra note 41, at § 4.0211].
52. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
The distinction was formulated in Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Ju-
risdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-64
(1966).
53. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 34.
54. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 892-93 (1988);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1971); RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 421(2)(e) (1987); CASAD, supra note 41,
§ 3.02[1]; BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 39.
55. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (reasoning that "due process is not offended
by a state's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are
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yjurisdiction may also be based on the defendant's physical presence in
the forum. On this basis, general jurisdiction has been established by
service upon corporate officers or directors found temporarily within the
state, otherwise known as "tag service." 7 Federal courts are presently
divided on whether due process permits jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration based on tag service.'
Applying the general principles outlined above to the three scenarios,
when the corporation is incorporated in the forum state, as in scenarios
one and two, the exercise of jurisdiction over that part of the entity lo-
cated within the United States is clearly constitutional.' Whether juris-
diction also extends to the parent, subsidiary, or joint venture located
overseas is another matter. Clearly, if the foreign entity has sufficient
contacts with the forum state in its own right, independent of its rela-
tionship with the local entity, jurisdiction would be proper.' This might
occur, for example, if the foreign parent or subsidiary corporation is con-
tinuously conducting business for its own account in the forum state."
However, if the foreign entity's only contact with the forum state is its
relationship with the local entity, jurisdiction will not be sustained, un-
less permitted under the agency or "alter ego" doctrines, discussed be-
low."
sufficient contacts between the state and the foreign corporation"); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (reasoning that it is fair and
reasonable to subject a corporation to personal jurisdiction when the corporation has
engaged in continuous and systematic activities in that state).
56. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 28 (1971).
57. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 50. A plurality of the Burnham Court sug-
gested that tag service on high-ranking corporate officers was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1 (plurality). Earlier language of the Court
seems to disagree. See, e.g., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S.
119, 122 (1927) (holding that jurisdiction over a corporation cannot be acquired sim-
ply by serving process upon an executive temporarily in a state if there are no other
business ties in the forum).
58. Compare Amusement Equip. Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding that transient service on a general manager of a non-resident defendant cor-
poration justified the assertion of general jurisdiction); Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown
Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same) with Scholz Research
& Dev., Inc. v. Kurzke, 720 F. Supp. 710, 712 (N.D. I1. 1989) (finding that the due
process clause does not permit jurisdiction over a company based upon tag service
on corporate officer); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (M.D.N.C.
1960) (same).
59. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 39.
60. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
61. CASAD, supra note 41 at § 3.02[21[b].
62. CASAD, supra note 41 at § 3.02[21[b][ix]. These doctrines, which allow the court
to pierce the local entity to reach an affiliated subsidiary or joint venture abroad, are
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Similarly, in scenario three, absent a showing that the foreign entity is
"engaging in business" in the state, general jurisdiction cannot be assert-
ed when the corporate defendant has no office or agent in the United
States.
3. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction alone limits the court to hearing claims related to
or arising out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. ' Accord-
ing to the United States Supreme Court, due process requires: (1) that
the defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state re-
sulting from an affirmative act of the defendant; and (2) that the asser-
tion of jurisdiction is "fair" under the circumstances."
According to the Court's more recent opinions, a defendant has suffi-
cient minimum contacts when it "'purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting [business] within the forum State."c5 Federal courts
have interpreted this standard rather strictly. For instance, when a for-
eign corporation merely enters into a contractual relationship with an
American party in the forum state,"' or purchases goods or services
not generally considered constitutional in origin. See infra notes 83-109 and accompa-
nying text.
63. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984);
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 52, at 113644; BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16,
at 69-95.
64. 2 MOORE, stpro note 41, 4.41-116]. If the defendant's contacts are more than
minimal, to the point of being "continuous and systematic," the court may assert
general jurisdiction. As mentioned, general jurisdiction allows the court to adjudicate
any claims arising from the defendant's activities, even if they are unrelated to the
forum state. BORN & WESTIN, supro note 16, at 34.
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Four Su-
preme Court Justices have interpreted this to mean that the defendant must engage
in conduct "purposefully directed toward the forum State," and that "[tlhe placement
of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defen-
dant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superi-
or Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality). In contrast, four other Justices adopted
the "stream of commerce" theory, under which a court may assert jurisdiction when
the defendant places goods in the stream of commerce that eventually find their way
into the forum state. Id. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment).
66. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) ("If the question is
whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically
establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum, we believe the
answer clearly is that it cannot.") (emphasis added). The Court. in Burger King up-
from the United States, ' or manufactures goods abroad that are then
sold or brought into the United States, courts have found these contacts
insufficient to establish minimum contacts." Courts have also held that
a manufacturer's advertising in trade magazines circulated worldwide is
insufficient."' Similarly, courts have denied jurisdiction when the foreign
executives or employees make isolated trips to the United States, either
to negotiate a contract with an American party or to attend a trade asso-
ciation meeting. '
With regard to the second due process requirement, what is "fair" may
depend on a number of factors, the most important of which is "the
burden on the defendant."' Other factors include:
held jurisdiction over the foreign defendants based not on the contract relationship
alone, but on the extensive relationship between the parties in negotiating, drafting,
and performing the contract. Id. at 482, 487; see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418
(finding that negotiating a contract for transportation services in Texas was insuffi-
cient to establish jurisdiction over the Peruvian defendant); Stuart v. Spademan, 772
F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[An exchange of communications between a res-
ident and a non-resident in developing a contract is insufficient of itself to be char-
acterized as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protection of the forum
state's laws.").
But see Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1364
(7th Cir. 1985) (upholding jurisdiction over a foreign buyer who contracted with U.S.
seller to have goods delivered to and inspected by the buyer's agent in the forum
state); Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding jurisdiction
over a foreign seller when seller traveled to California, contracted to sell wines ex-
clusively to the plaintiff, and actually shipped one parcel to him).
67. See, e.g., Wolf-Tec, Inc. v. Miller's Sausage Co., 899 F.2d 727, 728 (8th Cir.
1990) (rejecting long-arm jurisdiction when the defendant's only contact with the
forum state consisted of ordering goods by mail or telephone); Chrysler Corp. v.
Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1239 (6th Cir.) (holding that the purchase of an un-
specified volume of American parts by a foreign corporation alone was insufficient
contact for personal jurisdiction), cart. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
68. Asahl, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality). Id. (plurality).
69. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co.. 499 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.
Or. 1980); see also Albert Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 309 F. Supp. 456, 460
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (nationwide advertising program insufficient to justify jurisdiction in
New York).
70. See, e.g., Cascade Steel, 499 F. Supp. at 841 (declining to exercise jurisdiction
when employees made isolated trips); Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 360 F. Supp.
251, 252 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that attendance at trade association meetings was
insufficient contact); Easter Pre-Cast Corp. v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 311 F.
Supp. 896, 898 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (concluding that isolated purchases did not satisfy
minimum contacts); see also Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1194 ("The random use of interstate
commerce to negotiate and close a particular contract, the isolated shipment of goods
to the forum at the instigation of the resident plaintiffs, and the mailing of payments
to the forum, do not constitute the minimum contacts necessary to constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over [defendant].")
71. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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[1] the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute ... ; [21 the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief... ; [31 the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
[41 and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies.'
It is also important to note that when jurisdiction is asserted over an
alien defendant, as in all three scenarios, there is an implied presumption
against the finding of jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court advised in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,7 "'[gireat care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction
into the international field."'74 The Asahi court offered two explanations
for this "reserved" approach: first, there are "unique burdens placed upon
one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system;"' second, asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction over foreigners may arouse foreign resent-
ment or interfere with U.S. foreign relations.' Therefore, it appears that
a corporate entity's mere status as a foreigner, as depicted in scenario
three, may itself be grounds to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction.
4. Counting National Versus State Contacts
Typically, courts only consider the foreign defendant's contacts with
the forum state to determine whether general or specific jurisdiction
lies.7 7 However, when a party files suit pursuant to a federal statute that
authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process, a number of
federal circuits have considered both in-state contacts as well as the
defendant's contacts within the territory of the United States.' Thus,
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
74. Id. at 115 (plurality) (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 114 (plurality). To a foreign corporation, the American forum might be
greatly inconvenient and burdensome, particularly in light of liberal U.S. rules regard-
ing pretrial discovery. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16. at 92-93. Such considerations
should not weigh heavily in favor of the multi-national corporation, because in many
cases the court may conclude that it assumed the risk of such burdens.
76. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (plurality). For further commentary on the foreign
relations impact of assertions of jurisdiction over foreigners, see generally Born, su-
pra note 19.
77. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 34.
78. Id. at 96-123; see, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the worldwide service provisions of § 12 of the Clayton
Act authorize the consideration of national contacts); Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Vigman. 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the worldwide ser-
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when a plaintiff alleges violations of federal antitrust or securities laws,
courts have interpreted the worldwide service provisions of those stat-
utes as authorizing personal jurisdiction when the foreign corporation
has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States rather than any
particular state."' One justification proffered for this approach is that in
federal question cases, the sovereign seeking enforcement of the statute
is the United States government, and thus the relevant territorial scope
of jurisdiction is the nation as a whole.' Courts have generally held that
such an expansive reach of federal power is consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." The argument, however, has
vice provisions of § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act authorize national contacts
analysis); Herbstein v. Bruetman, 768 F. Supp. 79, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that
RICO's nationwide service provisions authorize a national contacts test); Nordic Bank
PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
79. See, e.g., Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413 (holding that worldwide service provisions
of § 12 of the Clayton Act authorize the consideration of national contacts); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (find-
ing that worldwide service of process and the venue provision in § 12 of the Clayton
Act are sufficient to satisfy personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation). But see
Sportmart, Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. 11. 1982) (rejecting worldwide
service of process because of the failure of the plaintiff to establish a "jurisdictional
nexus between the cause of action alleged and the transaction of business by [the
defendant]").
For national contacts analysis in securities suits, see e.g., Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a na-
tional contacts analysis is appropriate in a suit under Securities Exchange Act);
Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (same): Leasco Data Pro-
cessing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that use
of the word "wherever" rather than "where" demonstrates an intention by Congress to
authorize worldwide service of process).
80. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413; FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th
Cir. 1981).
81. See Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1984) (finding that due process only requires sufficient contacts within the United
States as a whole); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1238 (6th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 114243
(2d Cir. 1974) (same); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289
F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (same); see also United States v. Union Pac. R.R.,
98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878) (holding that nationwide service of process provided by
federal statute is consistent with due l)rocess).
A minority of courts have held that due process requires greater scrutiny than
mere national contacts. These courts have proposed a basic "fairness" test that con-
siders both state and national contacts. See, e.g.. Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration, Ltd.,
604 F. Supp. 1365, 1373 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (refusing to apply nationwide contacts
when contacts with the forum state were so marginal as to offend basic fairness);
GRM v. Equine Inv. & Mgmt. Group, 596 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1984) ("no
compelling reason to equate traditional fair play ... to minimum contacts with the
nation as a whole"); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191,
203 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (determining that nationwide "service power is not unlimited").
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not been successful when the federal statute fails to provide for at least
national service of process.'
When a federal statute does not provide for service, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(e) directs the court to borrow the long-arm statute of
the state in which the court sits. Most federal courts have narrowly con-
strued state long-arm statutes as not permitting jurisdiction based on
national contacts.
Thus in summary, a plaintiff will be allowed to count a foreign
defendant's national contacts only if a federal statute is involved that
authorizes national or worldwide service of process.
5. Subsidiary Jurisdiction
As noted above, when examining scenarios one and two, a branch
office, subsidiary, or parent incorporated within the forum state subjects
that locally based entity to the jurisdiction of local courts.' The real
question is whether jurisdiction can also extend to that part of the entity
located abroad by virtue of the corporate relationship alone. Whether the
82. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 & n.5 (1987) (refus-
ing to address national contacts issue because no provision of the Commodity Ex-
change Act authorized nationwide service); Chandler v. Barclays Bank PLC, 898 F.2d
1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding no personal jurisdiction because of the absence of
nationwide service); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 296 n.8 (3d Cir.)
(stating that the Pennsylvania statute allows for personal jurisdiction only on the
basis of contacts within the state), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 (3d Cir.) (allowing for personal jurisdic-
tion on the basis of a treaty authorizing nationwide service), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1085 (1981); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th
Cir. 1977) (rejecting use of national contacts test where Lanham Act does not pro-
vide for service of process).
See, e.g., Chandler, 898 F.2d at 1154 (rejecting nationwide service of process
absent some authorization within the patent laws); Max Daetwyler Coqj., 762 F.2d at
296 n.8 (reasoning that the Pennsylvania long-arm statute limits jurisdiction to con-
tacts with the state); Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. MA' Main Express. 758 F.2d
1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985) (determining that California's expansive long-arm statute
still requires minimum contacts with the state); Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 419 (holding
that Nevada long-arm statute, which required tortious acts have taken place "within"
Nevada, did not permit jurisdiction based on defendant's national contacts). But see
Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D. Conn. 1975) (holding
that Connecticut's long-arm statute requiring tortious acts to take place "in" the state
permitted use of a national contacts test).
83. See CAIsA, supra note 41, § 3.0111].
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court can "pierce the corporate veil" to reach the foreign corporation
depends upon the common law rules of agency.'
When the parent corporation establishes a branch office-an unincor-
porated affiliate-as in scenario one and two, in personam jurisdiction
over the entire corporation, both at home and abroad, clearly exists.
Courts obtain jurisdiction because the branch office is not distin-
guishable from the parent corporation itself; that is, they are legally re-
garded as the same entity. Thus, the presence of one in the forum is re-
garded as presence of the other.'
By contrast, where the parent corporation establishes a wholly-owned
subsidiary or joint venture abroad, as in scenario one and two, it is not
clear whether the entire corporate group is subject to in personam juris-
diction of the local courts." Legally, the parent and subsidiary are sepa-
rate entities and each are "citizens" of different countries. Each entity
presumably has their own set of directors, officers, and corporate books
making them totally separate corporations. Therefore, jurisdiction over
one corporation should not automatically confer jurisdiction over the
other.' However, if the domestic or foreign subsidiary acts as the agent
of its foreign parent or merely acts as the alter ego of the parent, a Unit-
ed States court may assert jurisdiction over the foreign entity.'
84. See generally id. § 3.02[2][b][ix]; 2 MOORE, supra note 41, 4.41-1[6]; BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 16, at 136-50.
85. CAskD. supra note 41, § 3.02[l. Courts regard service on the branch office of
a foreign corporation as service on the defendant's agent. Id. Even if there is no
branch office, if the foreign corporation has registered to do business in the state,
service can be made on the secretary of state or some other person authorized by
law to receive service of process, Id. Virtually all states require foreign corporations
to appoint a registered agent as a condition of conducting business within the state.
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 39. In either case, the assertion of jurisdiction
over a properly served foreign defendant is constitutional. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44 (1971); BORN & WESTIN, supa note 16, at 39.
86. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925) (holding
that judicial jurisdiction over a wholly-owned subsidiary does not alone confer juris-
diction over the foreign parent).
87. The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws describes the basic rule:
Judicial jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation does not of itself give a
state judicial jurisdiction over the parent corporation. This is true even
though the parent owns all of the subsidiary's stock. So a state does not
have judicial jurisdiction over a parent corporation merely because a subsid-
iary of the parent does business within its territory .... Judicial jurisdiction
over a parent corporation does not of itself give the state judicial jurisdiction
over a subsidiary corporation ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 52, cmt. b (1971).
88. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 136-37. The Second Restatement also recog-
nizes the alter ago exception:
Judicial jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation will . . . give the state judi-
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a. The "alter ego" doctrine
Under the alter ego doctrine, jurisdiction extends to the foreign entity
when the parent corporation disregards the separate existence and cor-
porate formalities of its subsidiary to such an extent that, in reality, there
exists just a single corporation.' This would be true, for example, if the
corporations failed to maintain separate boards of directors, books of
account, or offices.' Nevertheless, 100 percent stock ownership and
commonality of corporate personnel alone are not sufficient to establish
an alter ego relationship." Most courts generally require "proof of con-
cial jurisdiction over the parent corporation [and vice versa] if the parent so
controls and dominates the subsidiary as in effect to disregard the latter's
independent corporate existence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52, cmt. b (1971).
A determination that the foreign corporation is liable does not necessarily subject
its individual officers and directors to jurisdiction. 2 MOORE, supra note 41, 4.41-116 ] .
Jurisdiction over these actors must be predicated on some separate basis, such as
showing that they acted in their personal interest. Id.
89. See Cannon Mfg. Co., 267 U.S. at 336; see also Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp.,
710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983) (establishing that an alter ego relationship be-
tween two corporations requires "proof of control by the parent over the internal
business operations and affairs of the subsidiary"); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at
137; CASAD, supra note 41, § 4.03151[a]; 2 MOORE, supra note 41, 4.41-1161. Courts
have also used the alter ego theory to extend jurisdiction to a foreign subsidiary
through the contacts of a local sister subsidiary. CASAD, supra note 41, § 4.0315][c].
In such a case, the plaintiff must show that the affiliated corporations are merely ele-
ments of a single entity. Id.
90. See, e.g., Dickson v. Hertz Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1169, 1174, 1176 (D.V.I. 1983)
(upholding jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on license agreements with
two local entities that controlled the licensees to such a degree that it disregarded
their independent existence). But see Cavnon, 267 U.S. at 337 (refusing to impute the
activities of wholly-owned subsidiary to a parent when the books were separate and
the companies otherwise dealt with each other at arm's length); BORN & WESTIN,
supra note 16, at 142-43.
Other factors considered besides the sharing of books and personnel may in-
clude (1) how extensively and intensively does the parent control the subsidiary's
day-to-day operations; (2) how have the two corporations previously described their
relationship; (3) whether the two companies enter into separate contractual relations
with third parties; (4) to whom the two corporations account and pay for goods and
services rendered to each other; (5) and whether the companies are separately and
adequately capitalized. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 143.
91. See Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1985) (refusing to
impute the contacts of an in-state subsidiary to the foreign parent based on 100%
ownership or the commonality of two directors because the subsidiary's business
activities were sufficiently independent); Hlargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160 (refusing to ex-
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trol by the parent over the internal business operations and affairs of the
subsidiary" to an extent which is "greater than that normally associated
with common ownership and directorship."'
When federal antitrust violations are alleged, the United States Su-
preme Court has permitted a less rigorous standard than the alter ego
doctrine." In United States v. Scophony Corp. of America,' the Court
allowed jurisdiction even though separate corporate formalities were ob-
served." The Court justified jurisdiction on the grounds that the foreign
parent was highly involved in the activities of the U.S. subsidiary and had
exercised a significant degree of direct control and supervision over its
operations.' ' Other federal courts have followed the Scophony approach
tend jurisdiction to the British parent corporation when despite 100% ownership, the
two companies shared only one common director, no common officers, and main-
tained separate bank accounts); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483,
493 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Even were we to assume the existence of a parent-subsidiary
relationship, we can find no evidence that the parent exercised the type of control
necessary to ascribe it the activities of the subsidiary."); Peterson v. U-Haul Co., 409
F.2d 1174, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1969) (finding that a subsidiary doing business in one
state does not alone give a court jurisdiction over a parent corporation in another
state); Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1957) (reasoning that a
court does not have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation solely because the corpo-
ration owns stock in a subsidiary corporation "doing business" in that state); Blount
v. Peerless Chem. (P.R.) Inc., 316 F.2d 695, 699 (2d Cir.) (rejecting jurisdiction be-
cause the activities of the corporation's president were related to intra-corporate af-
fairs rather than business with New York residents), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Milken, 781 F. Supp. 226, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting
jurisdiction based merely on the foreign defendant's status as a parent or its minority
representation on the local entity's board); Schmid v. Roehm GmbH, 544 F. Supp.
272, 274 (D. Kan. 1982) (rejecting jurisdiction over a German corporation under alter
ego theory, despite commonality of directors, financial assistance, and occasional
failure to observe formal legal requirements).
92. Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160 (citations omitted); see also Product Promotions,
495 F.2d at 493; Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D.N.M. 1984); Schmid,
544 F. Supp. at 274. The analysis provided in Hargrave is instructive:
In terms of [the subsidiary's] internal affairs, it appears that [the British
parent] had complete authority over general policy decisions at [the subsid-
iary], including such matters as selection of product lines, hiring and firing of
[the subsidiary's] officers, and approval of sizable capital investments. Day-to-
day business and operational decisions, however, were made by [the subsid-
iary] officers. [The subsidiary] had sole responsibility for operation and man-
agement of its manufacturing facilities, research and development of new
products, and marketing and sales strategies.
Haigrave, 710 F.2d at 1160.
93. BORN & WESTIN, sup-a note 16, at 14243; 2 MOORE, supra note 41, 4.41-116]
n.39 (noting a split of opinion as to whether Scophony overruled Cannon by implica-
tion in the context of antitrust litigation).
94. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
95. Id. at 803-05.
96. Id. at 813-16. The Court noted that the relationship at issue had "the character
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in the antitrust context. 7
Courts also consider the international character of the litigation in
determining alter ego status."' Apparently, some courts have exercised
jurisdiction in "border-line" cases in which dominance and control were
less pronounced on the grounds that the U.S. plaintiff should not bear
the burden of litigating abroad."'
b. Agency theory
Under an agency theory, by contrast, courts may obtain jurisdiction
over the foreign parent or subsidiary even when the two corporations are
totally independent and no pervasive control by one over the other is
shown."" This situation occurs when the domestic entity has transacted
business on behalf of, or at the direction of, the foreign entity."' The
of a common enterprise" and "requir[ed] constant supervision and intervention beyond
normal exercise of shareholders' rights by the participating companies' representa-
tives." Id. at 816.
97. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. General Motor Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1201
(D.D.C. 1984) (holding that Toyota had significant control over its subsidiary because
Toyota held the rights to the import agreements, regularly sent representatives to the
subsidiary, and demanded that the subsidiary comply with certain standards set forth
by the Toyota corporation); see also King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., 565 F. Supp. 711,
715 (D. Md. 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 402 F. Supp. 262,
327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co.. 399 F. Supp. 838, 850 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp 367, 372-73 (D. Md. 1975), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977);
Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 365 (D. Colo. 1967). But see
Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus.. 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1547 (W.D. Pa.
1984) (denying jurisdiction based on the Cannon standard); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (holding that the stricter stan-
dard of Cannon is still good law).
98. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 144; 2 MOORE, supia note 41, 4.42-116].
99. See, e.g., Frito-Lay, 364 F. Supp. at 250 (noting that when the parent is an
alien, courts are more lenient in establishing an alter ego relationship because other-
wise the plaintiff would be denied a forum in which to litigate the claim); Tokyo
Boeki (USA) v. S.S. Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding jurisdic-
tion over the parent when the subsidiary is essentially a branch of the parent).
100. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 144-50; CASAD, supra note 41, § 3.0212][b]ivi.
Jurisdiction based on an agency relationship has been allowed even in the absence of
any corporate affiliation between the foreign corporation and local entity. See, e.g.,
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Katani Shipping Co., 429 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1970); Delray
Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft. lnc., 332 F.2d 135, 138-41 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); . Oliver Engerbretson, Inc. v. Aruba Palm Beach Hotel
& Casino, 587 F. Supp. 844, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
101. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson Ltd. v. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co., 325
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relationship necessary to establish agency must be more than incidental;
rather, courts generally require a significant delegation of power to the
local entity."' Although a parent-subsidiary relationship is not required,
a greater degree of corporate affiliation increases the chance that courts
will exercise jurisdiction over the foreign entity.' If the business trans-
acted through the domestic agent is "continuous and systematic," the
foreign corporation will be subject to general jurisdiction and can be
sued there for any action against it."' In contrast, when the defendant's
F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding that a subsidiary was transacting business in
the United States on behalf of Canadian parent), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964);
see also Ginter v. Swedish Match, A.B., 755 F. Supp. 545, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Larball
Publishing Co. v. CBS, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Brunswick Corp. v.
Suzuki Motor Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1421 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Bulova Watch Co. v.
K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Speizman Knitting Mach.
Co. v. Terrot Strickmaschinen GmbH, 505 F. Supp. 200, 202 (W.D.N.C. 1981); Crucible,
Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Credito e
Inversiones de San Miguel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 289 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D.P.R. 1968);
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc. 227 N.E. 2d 851, 854, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967).
The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws summarizes the agency theory as:
If the subsidiary corporation does an act. or causes effects, in the state at
the direction of the parent corporation or in the course of the parent
corporation's business, the state has judicial jurisdiction over the parent to
the same extent that it would have had jurisdiction if the parent had itself
done the act or caused the effects.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52 cmt. b (1971).
102. Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.) (stating that the gen-
eral agent must "have broad executive responsibilities and that his relationship [must]
reflect a degree of continuity"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); Gelfand v. Tanner
Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967) (requiring that the defendant's in-
state representative provide services beyond "mere solicitation" and that the services
be of such importance to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representa-
tive to perform them, it would have had its own officials provide the services), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
103. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 492 (5th Cir.
1974) (concluding that negotiations and contractual agreements established an agency
relationship); see also In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220.
235 n.26 (6th Cir. 1972); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 454 F.2d 527,
529-30 (1st Cir. 1972). The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws states:
Even in the absence of a stock relationship between a local and foreign
corporation, jurisdiction over the foreign corporation has sometimes been
exercised on the basis of activities that the local corporation has conducted
in the state as the agent of the foreign corporation. The existence of an
agency relationship may be found when the foreign corporation consigns
goods to the local corporation and exercises control over the latter with
respect to price, merchandising or advertising.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 52 cmt. b (1971).
104. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967)
(upholding jurisdiction even though defendant's business contacts with its reservations
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contacts are based on a more tenuous agency relationship, the court may
assert special jurisdiction and thus be limited to hearing claims arising
from or related to the relationship.'"' In reality, few cases have found a
foreign subsidiary or parent corporation subject to jurisdiction because
of the activity of a local entity absent an alter ego relationship. '
06
c. Conspiracy theory
One other basis for jurisdiction, related to the agency theory, is con-
spiracy jurisdiction.' The conspiracy theory permits a court to assert
jurisdiction over all co-conspirators, both resident and nonresident,
based on their involvement in a conspiracy occurring partially within the
forum.' 0 Specifically, the plaintiff must (1) "make a prima facie factual
showing of a conspiracy; (2) allege specific facts warranting the infer-
ence that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) show
that the defendant's co-conspirator committed a tortious act pursuant to
the conspiracy" in the forum."
agent in New York were totally unrelated to plaintiffs personal injury claim), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
105. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
106. CASAD, supra note 41, § 4.03[5)[b].
107. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 150.
108. See, e.g., American Land Program v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V.,
710 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that a nonresident publisher of a news-
paper was not a co-conspirator with the author of a libelous article for jurisdictional
purposes unless the publisher had involvement in the forum state); Leasco Data Pro-
cessing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that a
mere partnership alone could not support jurisdiction based on conspiracy because
the plaintiff failed to show that the absent partner had knowledge of the wrongdoing
or had delegated authority); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group, Ltd., 782 F. Supp.
215, 220-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding jurisdiction over Australian banks having no
other connection with the forum than involvement in a securities fraud conspiracy).
See generally Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDtIAM L. REV. 234 (1983); Lea
Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal J-urisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations:
Coryporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Stuart M. Riback,
Note, The Long Ar-m and Multiple Defendants: The Conspiracy Theor-y of In Perso-
nam Jurisdiction, 84 COL. L. REV. 506 (1984).
109. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd., 782 F. Supp. 215, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). To prove the conspiracy, itself the plaintiff must show (1) there was an agree-
ment between the defendants to violate U.S. law, (2) that one of the defendants com-
mitted an "illegal or fraudulent act" in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) that as
a result, the plaintiff, or someone outside the conspiracy, was injured or damaged.
See id.
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If a plaintiff proves a conspiracy, even a foreign defendant with no real
contact with the forum state and no direct business relations, as in sce-
nario three, would be subject to the local court's jurisdiction.
B. Venue
Assuming that the personal jurisdiction requirements are satisfied,
federal venue statutes specify the judicial district in which an action may
be brought."" For example, federal antitrust suits filed under section 12
of the Clayton Act may be brought in any district in which a corporate
defendant "is an inhabitant," "transacts business," or "may be found.""'
However, when the defendant is a foreign corporation, the terms of the
Alien Venue Act would seem to permit suit in any district, even if the de-
fendant had no contact with the state.12 Courts have reached this con-
clusion despite the narrower venue provisions of the Clayton Act, argu-
ing that Congress intended the Alien Venue Statute to override other spe-
cific venue provisions."' The perceived unfairness toward foreigners
may be alleviated by the federal venue transfer statute,"' or by the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens discussed below. More-
over, for suits against U.S. and foreign defendants jointly, as in a conspir-
acy claim, courts suggest that the residence of the U.S. defendant consti-
tutes the sole relevant criteria for venue purposes, notwithstanding the
Alien Venue Act."'
110. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 34244.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1988). The Alien Venue Act provides that "[a]n alien
may be sued in any district." Id. The statute has been held to apply to both individu-
al and corporate alien defendants. See Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus.,
406 U.S. 706, 710-11 (1971); Ohio Reinsurance Corp. v. British Nat'l Ins. Co., 587 F.
Supp. 710, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd, 575 F.
Supp. 1412, 1425 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Mowrey v. Johnson & Johnson, 524 F. Supp. 771,
774 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich.
1973).
113. Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1408-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (allow-
ing plaintiffs to pursue antitrust claims because narrow venue statutes should not be
a "shield against suit"); see also Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., Inc. 406
U.S. 706, 714 (1972) (Alien Venue Statute overrides venue provisions of patent stat-
ute). The justification put forth by the Supreme Court in Brunette was that
"§ 1391(d) is properly regarded, not as a venue restriction at all, but rather as a
declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside the
operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special." Brunette, 406 U.S. at
714. If the rule were otherwise, it would be possible that a foreign defendant would
be subject to jurisdiction based on substantial national contacts, but immune to suit
in any district because of a failure to meet the venue requirements of the federal
statute. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 343; AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 41, at
294-95.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) (used for transfers within the United States).
115. See, e.g., Mowrey v. Johnson & Johnson, 524 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D. Pa.
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C. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is the final jurisdictional issue
that may exempt the foreign entities in the above three scenarios from
U.S. law."' This judicially created doctrine permits a court with in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a defendant to send the action to an alternative
forum bearing a greater relationship to the dispute."'
Accordingly, the first inquiry in forum non conveniens analysis is
whether an "alternative" forum exists. The Supreme Court determined
that this inquiry involved a relatively easy determination in Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno:'
Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to
process' in the other jurisdiction. In rare circumstances, however, where the rem-
edy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not
be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirements may not be satisfied. Thus,
for example, dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does
not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute."'
The Court found that "rare circumstances" do not include situations in
which the foreign law is merely unfavorable to the plaintiff.'0 Rather, it
1981); Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D.N.J. 1966);
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 342.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which governs venue transfers between federal courts
within the United States, permits a district court to transfer "any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1988). In general, §1404(a) has been interpreted as requiring an analysis similar to
that applicable under the forum non conveniens doctrine. BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 277; IA MOORE, supra note 42, 4.02; CASAD, supra, note 41, § 5.06[21.
Section 1404(a) only applies to transfers between different federal courts, and not to
dismissal in favor of foreign forums, which are governed solely by foruom non conve-
niens doctrine. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 277. One other significant differ-
ence is that under § 1404(a), a court may properly grant a transfer upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience than is necessary under the common law doctrine. LA
MOORE, supra note 41, 4.02..
117. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 276. The increased use of forum nlo conve-
niens in recent years is due largely to the expanding reach of judicial jurisdiction
over foreign defendants. Id.
118. 454 U.S. 235, 255 n. 22 (1981).
119. Id.
120. Id. (criticizing the Third Circuit for considering the fact that Scottish law (toes
not recognize strict liability in tort, while plaintiff's choice of forum, California, does);
Coakes v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 831 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
lack of a contingent fee system in England was not a controlling factor); De Melo v.
Lederle Lab., 801 F.2d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1986) (absence of punitive damages in
Brazil does not make it an inadequate alternative forum).
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must be shown that the foreign law fails to provide for any remedy at
all. 2
12
The second part of the forum non conveniens inquiry focuses solely
on convenience. The Supreme Court suggested two sets of convenience
factors for determining whether dismissal is appropriate in Gulf Oil
Co p. v. Gilbert-'2 2 These factors include the "private interest of the liti-
gant[s], ' '1z which relate to the parties' practical inconvenience in litigat-
ing the suit locally, and "[flactors of public interest,"24 which concern
the administrative burdens placed on the local court in hearing the
suit.2 1 If the balance of these factors weighs strongly in favor of the de-
fendant, and if an appropriate alternative forum exists, then forum non
conveniens may apply, thus defeating the plaintiff's choice of forum.'
2
"
Although there is generally a strong presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's choice of forum, this presumption applies with less force for
121. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254; see also Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 538 F.
Supp. 262, 268 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (implying that an action would be dismissed under
Quebec law on the grounds of prescription, a non-waivable "substantive bar to a
cause of action"); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175,
1180-81 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (statute of limitations had run in India and there was a
substantial possibility that the Bombay court would not accept defendant's waiver of
the statute); Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania De Acero Del Pacifico S.A.,
528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court feared that fair trial could not be had
in Chile); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455-56 (Del. 1978)
(refusing to dismiss when it was unclear whether the alternative forum would recog-
nize the unjust enrichment and tort claims asserted).
122. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), superseded by statute as stated in Cowan v. Ford
Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1983).
123. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. The specific factors lying under the "private interests"
include:
[1] the relative ease of access to sources of proof; [2] availability of compul-
sory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining atten-
dance of willing, witnesses; [3] the possibility of view of premises, if view
would be appropriate to the action[;] ... [4] all other practical prob-
lems . . . [;1[5[ the enforceability of a judgment . .. [;] and [6] whether the
plaintiff [has sought to] "vex," "harass" or "oppress" the defendant.
Id.
124. Id. at 508-09. The specific factors of "public interest" include: (1) the adminis-
trative burden on a busy court in hearing another case; (2) if the dispute has little
relation to the forum, the burden imposed on jurors in hearing a case with little
import to their community; (3) the burden on the court in interpreting and applying
foreign law if the conflict of law provisions require the application of foreign law,
and; (4) the interests of the local versus the foreign forum in deciding the dispute.
Id.; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1981). For further discussion
on the appropriateness of governmental interest analysis in forum non conveniens,
see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 299-300.
125. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
126. Piper Airoaft, 454 U.S. at 254; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 84 (1971).
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foreign plaintiffs." For purposes of this Comment, because antitrust
statutes are regulatory in nature, the plaintiff in many cases is the United
States government making it unlikely that a court will overturn the pre-
sumptive validity of the U.S. forum.'" Furthermore, because of the
strong public interest factors favoring the U.S. forum, particularly the
strong U.S. interest in enforcing its economic regulations coupled with
the unlikeliness that the foreign jurisdiction will hear such claims, forum
non conveniens is not a strong defense for foreign defendants.'"'
D. Enforcement Jurisdiction
1. Quasi in rem/Attachment Jurisdiction
In the international business context, when corporate defendants are
able to move financial assets quickly and safely to foreign locations, the
issue of enforcement is especially problematic."' To forestall such tac-
tics, plaintiffs often seek provisional relief to prevent the transfer of the
defendant's assets pending the adjudication of the case on the merits."'
127. Piper Aircrqft, 454 U.S. at 255-56 ("[Tlhe plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled
to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum ... [because]
[wlhen the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice
is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
reasonable." (citation omitted)). This differential treatment by the Court seems driven
by the assumption that a foreign plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum is motivated by
substantive law, jury verdicts, and better discovery opportunities, rather than by "con-
venience" of the parties. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 288; CASAD, supra note
41, § 5.06121.
128. Generally, few reported decisions have actually relied on the forum non conve-
niens doctrine to dismiss a U.S. plaintiffs claims. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at
287.
129. See id. at 305. Some lower courts have concluded that forum non conveniens
is not available in antitrust actions. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817 (D.D.C. 1983).
But see Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. v. Fiat, S.p.A., 84 F.R.D. 299, 306
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding Italy an adequate alternative forum for an antitrust action);
John B. Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extrate)-ritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693 (1985) (arguing that forum non,
conveniens should apply to antitrust claims).
130. BORN & WESTIN, sup7-a note 16, at 125. "The risk of such evasion is especially
great in international cases, because assets can be removed to distant foreign coun-
tries where locating the property is difficult and where U.S. judgments may be unen-
forceable." Id.
131. Id. at 129. If the court has in pesonam jurisdiction over the defendant, it can
1245
This raises the final jurisdictional issue of the power of the court to se-
cure the plaintiffs remedy, otherwise known as attachment jurisdic-
tion. 132
Whether the attachment is sought before or after the entry of judg-
ment, two basic requirements must be met for attachment jurisdiction to
be valid: first, the relevant state or federal statute must authorize the
attachment; and second, that attachment must accord with due pro-
cess.'"' As the Court announced in Shaffer v. Heitner,"' "all assertions
of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe," including in ren and quasi in rem ac-
tions.' Thus, the presence of the defendant's assets in the forum, with-
out more, is not enough to permit the court to assert jurisdiction. "'
issue security orders preventing the transfer of the defendant's assets present within
the forum as well as those assets in other forums as well. Id.; see, e.g., United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378. 384 (1965) (upholding extraterritorial
security orders).
132. Attachment jurisdiction is one form of a court's quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Whereas in rein jurisdiction concerns the court's power to adjudicate interests in "a
specific property as against the whole world," quasi in ren jurisdiction concerns the
power to adjudicate interests in the specific property as to specific persons. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (5th ed. 1979). Quasi in ren jurisdiction consists of two types,
known as strict quasi in rem and attachment jurisdiction: in the former, the court is
entertaining a claim of a propriety interest in a specific property; in the latter the
court entertains a personal claim against a defendant based solely on the presence of
the defendant's property in the forum. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 125; CASAD,
supra note 41, § 1.01131.
133. "As with personal jurisdiction, federal courts will apply state jurisdictional stat-
utes, borrowed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e) and 64, in at-
tachment and garnishment suits." BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 125. These stat-
utes typically require that the defendant be notified either personally or by posting
and publication for a prescribed number of days. Id.; 2 MOORE, supra note 41,
4.41-1[5]. They also dictate the permissible boundaries of attachment jurisdiction,
which under some statutes extend to defendant's property located in other forums.
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 134-35.
134. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
135. Id. at 212 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
136. Id. at 208-09. In reference to the future treatment of in rem and quasi in remt
cases under the International Shoe standard, the Court noted that for in ren ac-
tions, where the source of the controversy is a claim to the property itself, "it would
be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." Id.
at 207. As the Court explained, this is because of the benefit received by the parties
from the State's protection of their potential interests and the State's strong interests
in assuring marketability of property and in providing a procedure for resolving such
disputes within its borders. Id. at 207-08. As for quasi in rem actions, particularly
attachment suits, the mere presence of the property within the forum will not alone
satisfy the International Shoe standard. Id. at 208. This is because
the property which now serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is
completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action. Thus, although the
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However, Shaffer allows the presence of the defendant's assets to
count towards "minimum contacts,""" and in response, the lower
courts, in interpreting the fairness standard, uphold jurisdiction when the
plaintiffs claims are in some way related to the property within the fo-
rum.
138
Shaffer also seems to provide an exception for a court's assertion of
"pure" attachment jurisdiction, that is, when the plaintiff seeks only to
secure property within the forum while the dispute is litigated on the
merits in another forum where in personam jurisdiction exists. "' If the
presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence
of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence
of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction.
Id. at 208-09.
137. Id. at 207-08. The definition of defendant's assets is an expansive one. It in-
cludes not only tangible and intangible assets that are registered in the corporation's
name, but also debts owed to the corporation. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 124
n.152.
138. See, e.g., Tampimex Oil Ltd. v. Latina Trading Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1201, 1202
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering the attachment of the oil buyer's property held in a New
York bank account even though the buyer had no offices or employees in the state);
Baker v. Young, 798 P.2d 889, 892-93 (Colo. 1990) (upholding the attachment of the
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction over
an Australian defendant in a suit arising out of an accident in Colorado); Consumers
United Ins. Co. v. Syverson, 738 P.2d 110, 113 (Mont. 1987) (holding sufficient mini-
mum contacts existed to confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in Montana
courts because the funds deposited by defendant in Montana banks were the subject
of the controversy); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (rejecting jurisdiction
over defendant in tort action based solely on the contacts of defendant's liability
insurer in the forum state). But see Papendick v. Bosch GmbH, 389 A.2d 1315, 1318
(Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (declining quasi in rem jurisdiction over shares of local sub-
sidiary of a German company, where plaintiffs claims were unrelated to shares and
were unliquidated), rev'd, 410 A.2d 148 (Del. 1979) and cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 129.
139. See Shoffer, 433 U.S. at 210 (acknowledging that mere presence of defendant's
assets in the forum is not enough to support jurisdiction on the merits but might be
enough to allow "jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as
security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be
maintained consistently with International Shoe"); Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (upholding attachment jurisdiction
over an $85 million debt owed to the defendant which had no relation to the dis-
pute, pending the plaintiff's filing of a suit in another forum that has in personam
jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 cmt. d (1986 Rev.
Apr. 15, 1986) ("[A] court may in proper circumstances assert control over local
property in aid of . . .proceedings elsewhere."). But see Stephens v. Walker, 743 F.
Supp. 670, 672 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (refusing to permit attachment of Arkansas property
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plaintiff shows that the presence of the defendant's property is not mere-
ly fortuitous, and that there are no other assets within the United States
from which the plaintiff could satisfy a potential judgment, courts gener-
ally uphold attachment jurisdiction. ." At least one lower court, in seem-
ing contradiction to Shaffer, has gone so far as to assert attachment ju-
risdiction over the defendant's property and allowed litigation to proceed
even though in personam jurisdiction did not exist.' The critical factor
that the court relied on was that the defendant was a foreigner with no
other contacts with the United States and thus was not subject to the
jurisdiction of any U.S. forum.'4 The special treatment in such extreme
cases is not completely groundless, given footnote thirty-seven of the




as security for action pending in Massachusetts).
140. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D.
Cal. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 cmt. d (1986 Rev. Apr. 15,
1986).
[A] court may in proper circumstances assert control over local properly in
aid of ... proceedings elsewhere .... [PIroper circumstances [include]
when dissipation of a fund is imminently threatened . .. [or when] . . . a
court in this country could not otherwise afford an adequate remedy to a
plaintiff who should be allowed to sue here.
Id. As the Restatement explains, permitting such attachment addresses the concern
that "Islome foreign countries will not recognize certain kinds of judgments rendered in
this country, for example, a judgment for taxes or penalties or a judgment based on
contacts [of the defendant] that the foreign country does not regard as a sufficient
bases for in personam jurisdiction." Id.
141. See Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Conn.
1977) (holding that a Connecticut plaintiff could depend solely on quasi in rem juris-
diction over a Kuwait citizen without satisfying personal jurisdiction if no other fo-
rum existed for the plaintiff); see also BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 134; CASAD,
supra note 41, § 4.06[3]; Steven fl. Becher, Note, The Applicability of Shaffer to the
Quasi-In-Rem Attachments of Foreigners' Assets, 12 VAND. J. TIRANSNAT'L. L. 393
(1979).
142. Louring, 455 F.Supp. at 633.
143. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977) ("This case does not raise,
and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the presence of defendant's
property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is avail-
able to the plaintiff."). Under jurisdiction "by necessity," a court could exercise ju-
risdiction in the absence of sufficient minimum contacts if it is shown that no other
forum for the plaintiff exists. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 49; see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984) (refusing
to consider the plaintiffs' argument that Colombian courts did not provide an ade-
quate alternative forum, and, therefore, that Texas courts could exercise "jurisdiction
by necessity.").
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2. Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments Abroad
In those cases where attachment jurisdiction is insufficient to satisfy
the plaintiffs judgment, such as when the presence of the defendant's
assets is fortuitous or when no assets exist in any U.S. forum, the
plaintiffs only hope is to seek recognition and enforcement of its U.S.
judgment in another forum.' When the defendant's assets are located
in another state, the plaintiff can enforce the judgment against those
defendant's assets via the Full Faith and Credit Clause."' This constitu-
tional provision requires state courts, as a matter of federal constitution-
al law, to recognize any valid final judgment rendered in another state of
the Union.4" Where defendant's assets are located in a foreign jurisdic-
tion, recognition and enforcement of the judgment will be less certain.
Currently, there are no treaties between the United States and other
nations that would permit assured recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments abroad.'47 Thus, each country's own rules guide the enforce-
144. See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 739-88. The distinction be-
tween recognition and enforcement is well explained there:
The "recognition" of a foreign judgment occurs when a . . . court relies upon
a foreign judicial decision to preclude litigation of a particular claim, or fac-
tual dispute, on the ground that it has been previously litigated abroad. Rec-
ognition is akin to the domestic U.S. doctrines of res judicalt and collateral
estoppel. In contrast, the "enforcement" of a foreign judgment occurs when a
court uses its coercive powers to compel a defendant ("judgment debtor") to
satisfy a judgment rendered abroad.
Id. at 740; see also RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIHE UNIT-
ED STATES § 481 cmt. b (1987).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (1971); BORN & WESTIN,
supra note 16, at 740; see U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every
other State.").
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93. A necessary precursor to
the application of Full Faith and Credit clause is that the rendering court had in
personam and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 740.
147. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 743. The United States and the United King-
dom unsuccessfully sought to conclude a bilateral agreement on mutual recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments between 1975 and 1976. See United Kingdom-
United States Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil Matters, 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977). Britain resisted the agreement, com-
plaining of excessive American tort damage awards and treble-damage antitrust judg-
ments. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 743 n.21; A. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS
74547 (1986).
By contrast, there has been widespread agreement on the enforcement of inter-
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ment of foreign judgments."
As a general rule, if one can be defined, U.S. judgments will not have
extraterritorial effect unless the foreign court finds that they were ren-
dered in conformity with standards recognized in international law."
This essentially requires that the foreign court be satisfied that the U.S.
court asserted valid in personam and subject matter jurisdiction, and
that the judgment was final and conclusive." '
But even if jurisdiction was proper, most foreign courts refuse to en-
force U.S. penal or tax judgments and any other judgment deemed repug-
nant to the public policy of the forum, otherwise known as the ordre
public.5' This defense is most likely to be raised against U.S. antitrust
judgments, because unlike regulatory law of most countries, U.S. anti-
trust law permits private citizens a cause of action against wrongdoers
and the enables the recovery of treble damages. '" Reporter's note 4 of
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States illustrates this point:
Some states appear to follow the rule that only the compensatory portion of a
judgment for multiple damages (if otherwise enforceable) will be enforced. Thus,
if a United States court in an antitrust action determined that the plaintiff had
been damaged to the extent of $100,000 and entered judgment for $300,000 in ac-
cordance with 15 U.S.C. § 15 [providing for treble damages], a foreign court might
national arbitration awards. More than 90 nations, including the United States, signed
the New York Convention, which requires courts of member nations to enforce arbi-
tration agreements and to recognize arbitral awards. See Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517; see also RESTATEMENT
(TIIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES § 487 (1987) (report-
ing on the Convention).
148. See ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS ABROAD (Philip R. Weems ed. 1988)
(detailing the procedural rules followed in various nations). State practice varies
widely. Some states refuse to recognize foreign judgments without a binding treaty or
proof of reciprocity, while others, like many U.S. states, will unilaterally recognize
foreign judgments as long as the proceedings afforded the parties are the equivalent
of due process. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES, ch. 8. (Introductory Note), at 591-92 (1987).
In the United States, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is a
matter of state law. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 743. For further discussion of
the recognition of foreign judgments within the United States, see id. at 739-88.
149. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON TIlE CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 792 (Kay & Bro. 1872).
150. A.W. SCOTT, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-04 (M & E Handbook Series 1979);
ARTIIUR K. KUIIN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 103-04 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981). As might be expected, the va-
lidity of jurisdiction is typically examined under the jurisdictional rules as applied by
the foreign court.
151. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES,
ch. 8 (Introductory Note) & § 483 (1987).
152. See id. § 483 & Reporter's Note 4.
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enforce only $100,000 of the judgment. Some foreign courts might regard the en-
tire judgment as penal and decline enforcement, both because the judgment is
much larger than required for reparation, and because the plaintiff had acted as a
"private attorney general," i.e., had sued to enforce a public law.' r
In some cases, the foreign court imposes an additional requirement of
reciprocity, refusing to recognize an otherwise valid U.S. judgment if U.S.
courts refuse to recognize judgments of the foreign court."
Thus, if the plaintiff is unable to secure its judgment as outlined above,
a new action in the country where the defendant is incorporated is the
only alternative. As previously mentioned, when the basis for the cause
of action is U.S. regulatory statutes, such as antitrust and securities regu-
lations, the foreign court will most likely not apply U.S. law.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH OF U.S. LAW GENERALLY
The extraterritorial reach of a country's law is typically a problem of
legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction. ' The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law defines legislative jurisdiction as the authority of a state
to make its substantive law applicable to conduct, relationships, or sta-
tus." It is distinguishable from judicial jurisdiction, discussed above,
153. Id. Great Britain has taken the latter, more extreme view with respect to for-
eign antitrust judgments. The British Protection. of Trading Interests Act. aimed pri-
marily at U.S. antitrust actions, renders unenforceable any part of a foreign antitrust
judgment for multiple damages or compensatory damages. See Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 §§ 5, 6. (Eng.), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRAD. REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 959, at F-1 (Apr. 10 1980). The statute even provides retroactive relief for
antitrust defendants doing business in Great Britain that have incurred treble damages
as a result of a foreign judgment. See id. § 6. This "clawback" provision creates a
cause of action permitting the antitrust defendant to recover the amount paid under
the judgment in excess of actual compensation. See id.
154. The U.S. Supreme Court took this position in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113.
(1895), refusing to enforce a French judgment because French courts would not *re-
ciprocally enforce a U.S. judgment in reverse circumstances. Id. at 227-28. The major-
ity of states have rejected the reciprocity principle, instead adopting a policy of uni-
lateral recognition subject to certain exceptions that roughly parallel those in interna-
tional law. See RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES § 481 cmt. d & Reporter's Note 1 (1987).
155. See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 541-645; Born, supra note 19;
Willis L.M. Rees, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978); Symposium,
Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer
1987); Note, supra note 23.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
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which is the power of a court to subject particular individuals or proper-
ty to its judicial process. It is also distinguishable from subject matter ju-
risdiction, which refers to the power of a court to entertain specified
classes of cases without regard to the applicable substantive rules of
law. 7 For example, United States federal courts, have limited subject
matter jurisdiction and may hear only those cases that involve a federal
question or diversity of citizenship."
In litigation,"' legislative jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction
are often confused because the former is typically challenged in a motion
to dismiss due to a court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction."" Other
times, courts address the issue as a question of dismissal for failure to
state a claim under the relevant statute."' The concepts, however, are
conceptually different and stand on different legal grounds. Most signifi-
cantly, unlike judicial or subject matter jurisdiction, the limits on legisla-
§ 401(a) (1987).
157. BORN & WESTIN, supia note 16, at 541-42.
158. See generally 1 MOORE, supa note 41, 0.60[2.-1]; BORN & WESTIN, supra note
16, at 542-71; CASAD, suprl note 41, § 1.01[1]; see also U.S. CONST. art. III.
159. There are two procedural ways to challenge the extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws: The defendant may file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 616, or for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The advantage of
a 12(b)(1) motion is that it can be made at any time during the proceedings, even
on appeal. 2A MOORE, supra note 41, 12.0712.-1]. Under 12(b)(6), by contrast, the
motion must generally be made within 20 days after service. Id. 12.06[1]. Moreover,
a defendant may be at a tactical disadvantage under a 12(b)(6) motion because the
judge is required to draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 616; see 2A MOORE, supra note 41, 12.07[2.-51.
In contrast, under 12(b)(1), the "judge has greater freedom to weigh the evidence and
discount the weight of the plaintiff's allegations and evidence." BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 616; see 2A MOORE. supra note 41, 12.0712.-5I.
160. Most lower courts have concluded that challenges to the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the antitrust. laws should be treated as attacks on subject matter jurisdic-
tion under Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 934
(9th Cir. 1991), af'd in par and revd in parl, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); Alpha
Lyracom Space Communications, Inc., v. Communications Satellite Corp., No. 89 Civ.
5021, 1993 WL 97313, at *6, (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 1993); The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes
Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 500 n.5 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Papst Moteren GmbH &
Co. v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions. Ltd., 617 F. Supp 920, 931 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1171-78 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
161. See, e.g., Romero v. International Tenuinal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384
(1959) (holding that no claim was available under the Jones Act); American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909) (holding that a complaint based
upon foreign conduct "alleges no case under the (Sherman Act]"), overrulled by Unit-
ed States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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tive jurisdiction do not derive from the U.S. Constitution but from cus-
tomary international law as interpreted by U.S. courts.
A. Constitutional Authority to Apply United States Law Overseas
Nothing in the Constitution expressly forbids Congress from passing
legislation that reaches beyond U.S. borders."'2 On the contrary, it is
generally held that Congress' broad power under the Constitution to
regulate commerce with foreign nations tacitly permits Congress to regu-
late conduct abroad."c' Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently upheld Congress' power to make laws applicable to
persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries when U.S. inter-
ests are affected."'
Some commentators have suggested that the Constitution may pose an
obstacle to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in certain circum-
stances, such as when the conduct at issue has only de minimis contact
with the United States. The origins of this theory stem from the Court's
pronouncements concerning the due process limits on a state applying
its substantive law to some disputes, otherwise known as choice-of-law
issues." In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,"' the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
State to apply its substantive law to disputes that have no reasonable
connection with the state.' 7 Specifically, the state must have "a signifi-
162. BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 574.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has broad power "[tlo regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations." Id.
164. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
704 (1962) (applying the Sherman Act to conduct occurring primarily in Canada);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7, 593 (1953) (upholding application of Jones
Act to conduct occurring at a foreign port); Steel v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,
285 (1952) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the application of the Lanham Act
to conduct occurring in Mexico); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621-23 (1927)
(applying prohibition laws to conduct occurring beyond territorial waters of the Unit-
ed States); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1922) (upholding extraterri-
torial application of legislation concerning fraud on the U.S. government); United
States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1818) ("The constitution having con-
ferred on congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no
doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they
may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence against the United
States.").
165. See Born, supra note 19, at 5-6 & n.16.
166. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
167. Id. at 320.
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cant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creat-
ing state interests, such that application of its law [is] neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair. '"" This contacts requirement is generally re-
garded as a relatively low due process hurdle.' " Though the Court has
not addressed whether due process also restricts Congress' ability to en-
act legislation that may apply overseas, it is assumed that the same limi-
tation applies.'7 '
Some courts have also asserted that due process may limit Congress'
prescriptive power when the application would be in violation of public
international law.' The prevailing rule, however, is that the norms of
international law are not binding on federal courts in applying a federal
statute.' Federal courts consult international law only "[wihere there
is ... no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.""'
Therefore, even if Congress enacts legislation in violation of international
law, U.S. courts are bound to apply the domestic statute.7 Nonethe-
less, federal courts have been admonished to avoid conflicts between
international law and domestic law by presuming that the two are consis-
tent.7 "
168. Id.
169. Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1805.
170. Born, supra note 19, at 6 n.16. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause ap-
pears to restrict the federal courts in the same manner as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restricts state courts. Id.
171. See, e.g., Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.l (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
172. RESTATEMENT (TIilRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
§ 115(1) (1987).
173. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
174. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945) ("[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to
the conduct outside the United States . . . . [Als a court of the United States, we
cannot look beyond our own law."); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Committee v. U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929. 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TtE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES § 115(1) (1987).
175. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963) (adopting rule of construction in favor of international law); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (same); Murray v. The Schooner Channing Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (reasoning that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains");
see also RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
§ 114 (1987).
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B. Traditional Bases of Legislative Jurisdiction
1. International Law
a. The presumption of territoriality
During the nineteenth century, the prevailing view in international law
was that a nation had the power to prescribe laws only within its own
boundaries.'76 This territoriality principle derives from states' sovereign-
ty over their own national territory, and is therefore the most common
and well recognized basis of jurisdiction. 7  The United States Supreme
Court openly adopted this doctrine by holding that absent an affirmative
indication by Congress that a statute has extraterritorial reach, federal
legislation will be presumed to apply only to conduct within U.S. territo-
ry. '7 The Court often justified its use of the doctrine out of respect for
foreign sovereignty, thus exercising what is known as "international
comity.""'7 Today, although territoriality is no longer the only basis for
jurisdiction, it is still applied when the extraterritorial reach of U.S. legis-
lation is in doubt. 's"
176. Born, supra note 19. at 10-21.
177. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TilE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19 (lst ed. 1834)
(adopting a territorial approach from principles of public international law); see also
American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Research in Interna-
tional Law of the Harvard Law School-Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 480-508 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research] (discussing the legit-
imacy of the "territoriality principle").
178. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a
long-standing principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a con-
trary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."') (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), superseded
by statute, as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
see also New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925); American Banana.
213 U.S. at 356-57 (1909).
179. See, e.g., American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (referring to the "comity of na-
tions"). The Court defines international comity as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another na-
tion, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); accord BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990); see also Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[Clomity teaches that, when possible,
the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since rec-
ognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promot-
ing predictability and stability.").
180. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2149 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (relying on Aramco's territoriality presumption in refusing to apply the
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b. Nationality
International law also recognizes the nationality of the defendant as an
additional basis for jurisdiction, thus permitting a state to exercise legis-
lative jurisdiction over its nationals and citizens, even when outside na-
tional territory.' s In U.S. courts, nationality jurisdiction was regarded as
the one exception to the cannon of statutory construction that presumed
territoriality." The rise of nationality jurisdiction became most notable
in the field of federal taxation, where the court has held that tax liability
attaches to all U.S. citizens wherever they reside." '
c. Birth of objective territoriality/the effects doctrine
With the arrival of the industrial age, business relationships became
more complex and more international. This was particularly true after
World War II, when the business community witnessed a wave of foreign
investment and the birth of a new entity-the multinational organization.
As a result, the principle of strict territoriality gave way to more far-
reaching concepts that permit economic regulation to extend to relation-
ships outside the boundaries of the regulating state." Under what has
become known as the "effects doctrine," a state can exercise legislative
jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the state, provided that the
Endangered Species Act overseas); Ararnco, 499 U.S. at 249 (applying a presumption
of territoriality to ambiguous "boilerplate" language of Title VII); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (rejecting the
extraterritorial application of the National Labor Relations Act); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hildalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (disallowing the application of the Labor
Management Relations Act for conduct occurring on a foreign ship by foreign sea-
men); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (denying the extension of the Eight-lour Day Act
to construction work in Iran and Iraq); New York v. Chrisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 32
(1925) (refusing a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for a tort that
occurred in Canada).
181. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 573; RESTATEMENT (Tiiti)) OF THE FoREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1987); STORY, supra note 177, at 21-
22 ("[N]o state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its
own territory, or persons not resident therein, whether they are natural born subjects
or others . . . [but] every nation has a right to bind its own subjects by its own
laws in every other place."); Harvard Research, supra note 177, at 519-39 (discussing
nationality principle).
182. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no
nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own
citizens."); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808) ("It is conceded that
the legislation of every country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can
only affect its own subjects or citizens."), overrled by Hudson & Smith v. Gruestier.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810)); see also STORtY, supra note 177, at 19.
183. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 62 (1924); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) (1992).
184. Born, supra note 19, at 21.
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conduct has sufficiently substantial and foreseeable effects with the
state's territory.'" The effects doctrine gained wide acceptance in U.S.
courts, especially in antitrust and securities cases.'"
Modern U.S. decisions, however, have shortened the reach of the ef-
fects doctrine by requiring a balancing of governmental interests before
permitting a law to apply beyond U.S. borders.'87 This modified ap-
proach came in the face of substantial criticism that U.S. court's were
overreaching in applying antitrust and securities laws."e
d. Passive personality principle
A final but rarely invoked basis of jurisdiction recognized by interna-
tional law is the passive personality or protective principle, which per-
mits the regulation of foreign conduct that threatens national security or
is aimed to harm U.S. nationals."" The protective principle was em-
ployed, for example, in justifying the much criticized enforcement of the
185. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at. 573; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987). The birth of the effects
doctrine in public international law is often associated with the Lotus case. a deci-
sion of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), now the World Court.
The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). Lotus addressed
whether public international law forbade Turkey from applying its criminal law to the
conduct of a French officer allegedly responsible for a collision between French and
Turkish vessels in Turkish waters resulting in the deaths of several Turkish sailors.
Id. at 28. The PCIJ held that Turkish courts were not barred from exercising jurisdic-
tion because no rule in international law prohibited a state from applying its laws to
conduct outside of its borders. Id. at 45. To the contrary, the court pointed out that
the prevailing view in many countries was that their respective criminal laws could
apply to individuals even when the acts are committed in the territory of another
state, "if one of the constituent elements of the offense, and more especially its ef-
fects, have taken place" in the offended state. Id. at 38.
186. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 20 & 4548 (securities laws) & 29-39
(antitrust). For a further discussion of the development of the effects doctrine in an-
titrust jurisprudence, see ittfra notes 21440 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98
(3d Cir. 1979) (adopting a ten factor test for the effects doctrine); Timberlane Lum-
ber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Timberl)ne 1]
(injecting a seven-factor test into the effects doctrine). For further commentary on
the comity doctrine in legislative jurisdiction, see inffra notes 250-381 and accompany-
ing text.
188. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 600-02.
189. RESTATEMENT (TiHIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
§ 402(3) (1987); see also Harvard Research, supra note 177, at 543-61 (discussing the
protective principle).
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Export Administration Act against foreign European corporations that
traded with the Soviet Union during the 1970s."D
2. Legislative Jurisdiction in U.S. Courts
The foregoing bases of jurisdiction, as developed under international
law, have been extremely influential in guiding U.S. courts faced with the
legislative jurisdiction issue. Although the issue of legislative jurisdiction
is theoretically governed by U.S. rather than international law, courts
often adopt the cannon of statutory construction that Congress, in draft-
ing legislation, did not intend to violate international law limits on juris-
diction. 9' Thus, absent any legislative directive, courts will commonly
choose from the aforementioned standards.
The question remains, which standard do courts apply most frequently
and when? Judicial authority is in serious conflict. In some cases courts
adopt the long-standing cannon of statutory construction that presumes
"that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." "'
In other cases, the more expansive doctrines of nationality or effects are
employed.' 3 The only reliable predictor appears to be the subject mat-
190. See generally Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, 50 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1987) (discussing in depth the Soviet pipeline incident); Europe-
an Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the
U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891, 891-904 (1982). Other examples of the protective principle are
visible in the international criminal law field, which recognizes that some crimes,
such as war-crimes, are so universally condemned that any nation which has custody
of a perpetrator has jurisdiction to punish him. See In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp.
544, 555-56 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50-57 (D.C.
Jerusalem 1961) (holding that despite official protests from Argentina, Israeli courts
retained jurisdiction because the defendant committed international crimes), affld, 36
I.L.R. (S. Ct. Israel 1962).
191. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2919 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the canon of construction that legislation should not violate
international law); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824) ("It cannot be
presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of
nations."); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.").
192. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)), superseded by statute as stated in
Stender v. Lucky Stores, 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). In Aramco the Court
held that the existing version of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
reach outside U.S. territory even though the statute contained broad provisions ex-
tending its prohibitions to "'any activity, business or industry in commerce.'" Id. at
248 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1964)). The Court reasoned that such "boilerplate
language" was an insufficient indication to override the presumption against extraterri-
toriality. Id. at 248-49.
193. See, e.g., Socibt6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958) (allowing
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ter at issue. In antitrust and securities cases, for instance, courts have fa-
vored extraterritorial application, and thus have commonly interpreted
the statutes to incorporate an effects doctrine.'"' In employment and
environment cases, by contrast, the courts are far more likely to revert
to the age-old canon of statutory construction presuming territoriality."'3
extraterritorial discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co.. 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952) (holding that court has jurisdiction under the
Lanham Act in a case against a U.S. citizen for trademark infringement and unfair
competition abroad); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968)
(finding extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d
416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (upholding application of the Sherman Antitrust Act overseas).
194. BORN & WESTIN, suprat note 16, at 590-91. The adoption of the effects doctrine
in the antitrust field began with United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1927), holding that appellees who became parties to a conspiracy intending to re-
strain trade were within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Id. at 276. The doctrine
reached its most pronounced acceptance in Alcoa, in which the court argued that an
agreement was unlawful if it intended to affect imports and did in fact affect them.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891,
2909 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6
(1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962).
In the securities field, see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1968) (adopting the effects test for the first time), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (adopting the ef-
fects test put forth by the second circuit); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 730
F.2d 1103, 1105-06 (7th Cir.) (adopting the effects test and the conduct test), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).
195. For an example of the resurgence of the territoriality presumption in the em-
ployment and environmental fields, see Arornco, 499 U.S. at 250-51 (rejecting extrater-
ritorial application of Title VII to a Delaware corporation doing business in Saudi
Arabia); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, 923 F.2d
678, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Railway Labor Act does not apply to
collective bargaining agreements allegedly breached by the hiring of foreign nationals
for intra-European flights), vacated, 966 F.2d 457, 458-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (withdrawing
the opinion for mootness and remanding to the district court to determine whether
the judgment that the Act did not apply overseas should be vacated for mootness);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that Con-
gress could not have intended for one provision of the Endangered Species Act of
1973 to apply only to domestic projects while extending another provision to foreign
projects), rev'd on other gi-aunds, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (both NEPA and the Endan-
gered Species Act apply only to U.S. govt agencies); Cleary v. United States Lines,
728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act
applies only within U.S. borders). Congress overturned the results of Avamco in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991), and
Cleary by the Older American Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a),
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
U.S. antitrust law includes a number of different federal and state laws
regulating the methods by which business enterprises compete with one
another and deal with their customers, suppliers, and others."' The two
U.S. antitrust provisions most frequently invoked are sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. Section 1 declares illegal "[elvery contract, combina-
tion.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several [s]tates, or with foreign nations.""'7 Section 2 specifically forbids
any person to "monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several [s]tates, or with foreign nations.""'
Most governments today have similar provisions prohibiting such
anticompetitive activity,"' but the U.S. approach to antitrust differs
markedly in several important respects. In the United States, for exam-
ple, antitrust law is enforced both by the government and by private
individuals, whereas in most other nations, enforcement is left to the
government."' Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes private actions in
federal court for treble damages for injuries suffered as a result of viola-
tions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."" Section 26 also provides
for injunctive relief in federal courts. 2 And, perhaps most significantly,
antitrust enforcement in other nations has been less stringent than in the
United States, at least until very recent times.2 :'
98 Stat. 1792 (1984).
196. See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 41. The major federal antitrust
laws, located throughout Title 15 of the United States Code, consist of the Sherman,
Federal Trade Commission, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988) (Sherman Act); §§ 41-58 (FTC Act); § 12-27 (Clayton Act); § 13 (Robinson-
Patman Act). These laws are principally aimed at regulating the business relationships
among firms, both competitors and those within a chain of distribution. The main
thrust of these laws is to prohibit contracts, combinations or conspiracies which
harm or threaten to harm competitive markets. See 1 PIIILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, P 103 (1978) (listing a variety of antitrust objectives both
political and economic). Such threats can come in various forms, including direct or
indirect price fixing among competitors, as well as other predatory activity. See gen-
erally id.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
199. For a brief analysis of the antitrust laws of other nations, see infra notes 497-
504 and accompanying text.
200. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 602.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1088).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
203. See Chang, supra note 32, at 296 n.6. For a commentary on the enhanced anti-
trust enforcement among other nations, see infra notes 497-507 and accompanying
text.
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A. A Presumption of Territoriality
Although provisions of the various U.S. antitrust statutes contain lan-
guage making those laws applicable to "trade as commerce ... with
foreign nations,"'" the statutes are silent on the specific question of ex-
traterritorial application. In its early decisions, the Court refused to give
an expansive meaning to these words, stating that they were merely
"[w]ords having universal scope."22
Thus, without any clear guidance in the text of the statutes, early judi-
cial decisions applied a presumption of territorial application to U.S.
antitrust law, in line with the prevailing view in international law.
The Supreme Court's decision in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co."' clearly expressed this view. American Banana arose when
one U.S. company sued another for alleged predatory practices by the
defendant designed to drive the plaintiff from the Central American Ba-
nana market."7 Among other things, the defendant, United Fruit, alleg-
edly persuaded the Costa Rican government to use the Costa Rican mili-
tia to wrongfully evict the plaintiff, American Banana, from American
Banana's properties. " In holding that the plaintiffs action should be
dismissed, the Court announced its adoption of the rule of territoriality:
"[Iun case of doubt [courts should adopt] a construction of any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power."
-2 1
This narrow approach was consistent, the Court explained, with the
prevailing rules in both public and private international law.' Under
private international law, also known as "choice of law," the "almost
204. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) ("Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations.") (emphasis added); 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize . . . any part of trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations.") (emphasis add-
ed).
205. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909), overnded
by United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). Not until passage of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in 1988 did Congress specifically
address extraterritoriality. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a)(3) (1988). For further discussion of the FTAIA
see itfra *notes 234 & 282 and accompanying text.
206. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
207. Id. at 354.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 357.
210. Id. at 355-56.
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must
be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."112"1 Under notions of public international law, or "the law of na-
tions," to permit the application of U.S. law to conduct occurring in a
foreign nation would "not only ... be unjust, but would be an interfer-
ence with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations."" ' Although the Court also relied on the "act of state doctrine"
to justify dismissal,"'" the clear implication was that U.S. antitrust law
could not be applied to conduct taking place outside the United States.
B. The Rise of the Effects Doctrine
The reign of American Banana's territorial approach quickly subsided,
however. As U.S. corporations became bigger, more powerful, and more
international, U.S. government regulation grew more aggressive and far-
reaching."' In this business environment, the need to control the activi-
ties of U.S. corporations whose anti-competitive conduct abroad could
affect domestic commerce forced judges to reform old doctrines to keep
up with the new age."
The beginnings of change could be seen as early as 1927 when the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,26 decided to uphold
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to a conspiracy be-
tween U.S. and Mexican firms to monopolize the production and import
of a Mexican rope into the United States. The Court attempted to distin-
guish American Banana by noting that a few of the agreements in the
conspiracy took place in the United States and that the conspiracy was
funded by U.S. banks.2 Yet the departure from the doctrine of strict
territoriality was apparent from the Court's assertion that the conspiracy
"brought about forbidden results within the United States."21
211. Id. at 356 (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 357-58. The act of state doctrine, derived from the international law-doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, is invoked to prohibit U.S. judicial inquiry into the legali-
ty of foreign sovereign acts committed on foreign territory. See generally BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 16, at 647-738.
214. See Born, supra note 19, at 31.
215. Id.
216. 274 U.S. 268, 274-76 (1927). Actually, the turn away from strict territoriality
could be seen earlier in decisions involving transportation companies accused of con-
spiring to monopolize railway or shipping routes to or from the United States. See
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106. 108 (1911); United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation, 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser. 243
U.S. 66, 88 (1917).
217. Id. at 275-76.
218. Id. at 276.
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The break was most apparent in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa),2 in which Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Sec-
ond Circuit, explicitly rejected the strict territoriality presumption and
instead adopted an expansive formulation of the "effects doctrine."-2" In
Alcoa, the government accused a Canadian affiliate of a United States
company of violating the Sherman Act by setting up and executing an
international aluminum cartel abroad." The Second Circuit, sitting as
the court of last resort because the Supreme Court lacked a quorum,
held that the Sherman Act reached the Canadian corporation's participa-
tion in the cartel, even though most of the conduct at issue occurred
outside the United States. 2 Judge Hand, in embracing an "effects doc-
trine," stated that as long as the conduct in question (1) was intended to
affect U.S. commerce; and (2) actually did affect U.S. commerce, it could
be regulated." As in American Banana, the Alcoa court drew exclu-
sively upon contemporary concepts in both private and public interna-
tional law which, in the court's view, had come to recognize a state's
right to "impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,"
if their conduct "has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends.""
219. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
220. Id. at 443-44.
221. Id. at 421. The government's antitrust suit sought to break up Alcoa's U.S. alu-
minum holdings and to prohibit the participation of Alcoa and Aluminum Limited in
an international cartel involving several major European aluminum companies. Id. Alu-
minum Limited, a Canadian corporation, had been a division of Alcoa in the past,
and, at the time of the government's suit, continued to be controlled by Alcoa share-
holders. Id.
222. Id. at 444.
223. Id. at 443-44. Notably, such an effects doctrine does not apply to conduct that
may have unintended repercussions in the United States, nor to agreements that are
intended to affect U.S. trade, but that have no such effect. Id. at 443-44. It does,
however, apply to agreements that have the intended effect of adversely impacting
U.S. commerce. Id. Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant intended to affect
commerce, then the burden of proving no effect on U.S. commerce shifts to the de-
fendant. Id. at 444. Applying this new standard, the court found that the Canadian
defendants specifically intended to affect U.S. commerce by agreeing to a quota sys-
tem for imports, and that the import trade was indeed affected. Id.
224. Id. About the same time, private international law began to shed the old hard
and fast rules derived from notions of territoriality. See e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) ("The law of the place of the wrong deternlines whether
a person has sustained a legal injury."). Newer, more flexible rules looked instead to
the forum with the most "significant relationship" to the transaction, and permitted
the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws by adopting an effects doctrine. See RE-
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The Alcoa effects doctrine rapidly gained acceptance in U.S. jurispru-
dence." The Supreme Court, while approving of the Alcoa effects test
in subsequent opinions, " has provided relatively little guidance regard-
ing the precise meaning of the "intent/effects" test set out by Judge
Hand. Lower courts have, in turn, taken several roads of interpreta-
tion.
7
As for the intent prong of the test, some courts have taken a more ex-
pansive view by simply omitting the intent requirement and adopting a
pure effects test."' Other courts, by contrast, have required a showing
of specific intent to affect U.S. commerce,""i and in some cases relaxed
the requirement to one of general intent.
2
3
As for the effects prong, lower courts disagree over the magnitude of
the effect on U.S. commerce necessary to sustain jurisdiction."'I None-
theless, it is generally agreed that when the anticompetitive effects with-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934). In Alcoa, Judge Hand cited § 65 of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, which, as noted above, recognized an effects doctrine. Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 443.
225. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES § 18 (1965) (citing Alcoa to justify effects test as basis for legislative juris-
diction). The ALI modified the doctrine in the Second Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law by requiring that the challenged conduct have a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect to amount to an antitrust violation, Id.; see also Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (adopting "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" test).
226. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993) ("[lit
is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 113 n.8 (1969)
(noting that it chooses not to disturb the Alcoa decision, as well as others); Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690. 704-05 (1962) (same).
227. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 597.
228. See, e.g. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 889 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President
Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
229. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513. 524-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), offd 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
230. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1184
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27
(S.D.N.Y 1975); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 889-91 (D.N.J.
1949).
231. See, e.g., Power E. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y.),
aj.'d mem., 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card
Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus.,
473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz.
Info. Ctr., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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in the United States are merely "speculative" or "de minimis," extraterri-
torial reach is inappropriate." ' The most widely recognized and most
restrictive test requires a "substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effect
on U.S. commerce."" Congress also adopted this heightened standard in
enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
(FTAIA),"' which attempted to spell out more clearly for lower courts
the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission
Acts.2 , Although the more rigorous FTAIA standard was not intended
232. See, e.g., Montreal Trading v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); El Cid v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626,
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd mem., 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021
(1985); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Ind., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687
(S.D.N.Y 1979).
233. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
6-7 (1977) (adopting "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" test) [here-
inafter 1977 Antitrust Guidelines]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 87-91 (1988), reprinted in 53
Fed. Reg. 21584, 21595 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Antitrust Guidelines]; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) (same);
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (same).
234. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat.
1246 (1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988)). The Act pro-
vides that the Sherman Act:
shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
feet-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a per-
son engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7
of this title, other than this section
15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (emphasis added). Congress' primary motive in enacting the
FTAIA was "to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in overseas markets, by free-
ing them from antitrust restraints on activities in 'export trade.'" BORN & WESTIN, su-
pra note 16, at 599; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-686. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-33, 9-10
(1982).
235. Some authority contends that the FTAIA also covers Clayton Act claims. See
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 599 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAl. OPERATIONS 91 (1988)).
The heightened standard adopted by the Act has resulted in a number of lower
court opinions dismissing antitrust actions altogether. See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell
Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 1988); McElderry v. Cathay Pac. Airways. 678
F. Supp. 1071, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Ilanes Printables, Inc..
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to apply to conduct involving import trade, the House report on the Bill
indicated that it could apply to a wholly foreign transaction that affected
domestic commerce or a domestic competitor. " ' Cases involving import
trade they remain subject to the more expansive, far reaching rules
adopted by various circuits. 2 '7 The Justice Department's 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations similarly endorsed
a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" test to use in
evaluating anticompetitive conduct abroad."" Besides requiring a great-
er magnitude of effects, some lower courts have made extraterritorial
reach more difficult by placing on the plaintiff the burden of showing
anticompetitive effects on U.S. export trade. This prevents foreign com-
panies from "piggy backing" on the injury suffered by other U.S. com-
panies not involved in the suit."
Putting aside the disagreements among courts as to what version of
the effects test to apply, the impact of Alcoa was clear. After Alcoa, the
U.S. filed dozens of major actions against international cartels created
partially or entirely abroad. 0
663 F. Supp. 494, 500 (M.D.N.C 1987); Papst Moteren GmbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-
Goshu (USA), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864, 869 (S.D.N.Y 1986); Liamuiga Tours v. Travel
Impressions Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920, 922-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Eurim-Pharm GmbH v.
Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The I'TAIA did not attempt to change the ability of courts to decline the exer-
cise of prescriptive jurisdiction based on international comity. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). For a discussion of the comity doctrine, see infra notes
250-381 and accompanying text.
236. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10.
237. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 600.
The International Unfair Competition Act of 1993, pending before Congress,
would take an aggressive stance to certain types of "unfair" import trade. The Act
would essentially create a cause of action against foreign entities that extract monop-
oly profits at home and then import their goods into the United States for below
cost. See generally S. REP. No. 99, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
238. 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21595.
239. The 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 499-500
(M.D.N.C. 1987). This more restrictive approach was echoed in 1988 when the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division revised its guidelines and suggested that it would en-
force the antitrust laws only where U.S. consumers were harmed. See 1988 Antitrust
Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21595.
240. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298,
318-19 (D.D.C. 1960) (denying sovereign immunity to Philippine government so United
States could pursue antitrust violations of the shipping industry); United States v.
Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., 133 F. Supp 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that
Swiss corporations were present in the United States for purposes of service of pro-
cess); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(failing to grant immunity for a British corporation); United States v. General Elec.
Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (holding a German corporation subject to
U.S. antitrust law); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian
Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (finding that a Canadian cor-
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C. Foreign Reaction
The reaction among academics and foreign governments was not posi-
tive. Great Britain, for example, quickly criticized the doctrine as too far-
reaching, arguing that it threatened to interfere with foreign sovereignty
interests."' This is a chronic problem in matters of antitrust because
one state's economic policy may conflict sharply with another's antitrust
policy.2 ' Criticism was also spurred by the unique U.S. procedural
framework, which permits private individuals to enforce U.S. antitrust
law and obtain treble damages.44 There were also complaints among
foreigners that the United States did not apply antitrust law with con-
sistency and that the enforcement often sought to advance the commer-
cial interests of U.S. companies. '
In retaliation, several countries enacted "blocking statutes," prohibiting
compliance with U.S. discovery in antitrust cases, with the goal of con-
fining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.246 There are two
poration was doing business in the United States).
242. See British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [19521 2 All E.R.
780, 782 (holding that a U.S. district court. restraining order against a British company
is an inappropriate assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction); Roger P. Alford, The
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law: The United States and European Com-
mnunity Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1993) (questioning the notion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction). Regulating economic affairs is a vital aspect of national sover-
eignty, and thus it is widely held abroad that foreign law, not U.S. law, should gov-
ern the economic activity occurring within a foreign state's boundaries. BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 16, at 601.
243. See Rio Tinto Zinc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [19781 1 All E.R. (H.L.) 434,
448 (Lord Wilberforce).
244. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 602. Enforcement of antitrust laws is gener-
ally regarded as a task for the government, and thus the U.S. policy permitting pri-
vate individuals to initiate suits that can effect local regulatory interests has generat-
ed strong resistance abroad. Id.
245. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 601 n.80; see also Beckett, Transnational
Litigation-Part H: Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad (United Kingdom), 18
INT'L LAW. 773, 774 (1984).
246. Chang, supra note 32, at 296; Alford. supra note 242, at 10; P.C.F. Pettit &
C.J.D. Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of Unit-
ed States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697, 707-14 (1982). Such "blocking statutes"
include the Australian Foreign Proceedings Act, Austl. Acts 121 (1976); the Canadian
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, S.C. 1863 (1984); a French blocking
statute, Journal Official de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] 1799 (1980) (No. 80-538, ed.
Lois et Decrets); South Africa's Protection of Businesses Act (1978), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 127 (1979); and the United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
ch. 11.
1267
kinds of blocking statutes. First, "discovery blocking statutes" restrict the
extent to which U.S. litigants can obtain evidence or compel production
of commercial documents abroad for use in U.S. antitrust proceed-
ings.1 7 Second, "judgment blocking statutes" restrict, directly or indi-
rectly, the enforcement of U.S. judgments."' Great Britain has enacted
both types of statutes, and even went so far as to provide a "clawback"
provision under which firms making treble damage payments under U.S.
antitrust law could bring suit to recover two-thirds of treble damages
assessed against them. 
4
D. Comity-Based Limitations on the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Law
1. The Rise and Fall of International Comity-Based Interest
Balancing in Legislative Jurisdiction
In part because of negative foreign reaction and academic criticism,
U.S. courts and regulatory authorities sought to moderate the extraterri-
torial reach of the Sherman Act and other federal antitrust laws.2" The
first forms of modification came in the form of requiring that the effects
in the United States be "substantial," or "foreseeable. -2 ' ' These efforts,
however, did not address the central concern of foreign governments
that their regulatory interests and sovereignty were being ignored. As a
result, legal scholars proposed that courts consider, in addition to the
effects on U.S. commerce, factors reflecting the regulatory goals of other
interested nations."S In essence, these factors would add a "reasonable-
247. Chang, supra note 32, at 296.
248. Id.
249. United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 ch. 11 § 6. These
provisions apply regardless of whether the anticompetitive conduct giving rise to the
U.S. antitrust award took place in the United Kingdom, in the United States, or in
some third country, and regardless of whether the party seeking relief is a U.K. na-
tional. For further commentary on the act, see generally A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Carl A. Circa, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block
American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982).
250. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 603-04.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., 1963 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (requiring "substantial" effects); United States v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 889-91 (D.N.J. 1949) (emphasizing foreseeable effects);
see also 1977 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 234, at E2 to E3 (discussing substan-
tial and foreseeable effects); 1988 Antititst Guidelines, supra, note 234, at 21595
(advocating direct, substantial, or reasonably foreseeable standard).
252. See JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD 446 (1958) (proposing that courts adopt a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
which would consider the sovereign interests of foreign nations in the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TIlE FOREIGN
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ness" or "comity" prong to the legal equation of the effects doctrine. "'
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America" represents one of the
earliest and best-known cases implementing the "comity" approach. In
Timberlane, a private U.S. plaintiff operating a lumber company in Hon-
duras charged several U.S. companies with violating sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act by allegedly conspiring to drive the plaintiff out of the
Honduran lumber market. 2 The defendants sought to dismiss the com-
plaint, arguing that their alleged actions did not have any direct or sub-
stantial effect on U.S. foreign commerce, and therefore, pursuant to
Alcoa, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2" The Timberlane
court first declined to embrace a pure Alcoa "effects" test,27 stating that
when considering the application of U.S. law overseas, a court must also
consider the regulatory concerns of the other countries involved. '5
RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES, § 40 (1965). The factors in the Second Re-
statement were limited to situations in which two states, each having jurisdiction to
prescribe rules of law, required inconsistent conduct by a person or corporation. In
such a case, international law requires a state to moderate the exercise of its en-
forcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule proscribed by that state.
Id.
253. See Born, supra note 19, at 33-34.
254. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Timberlane 1], 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) [hereinafter Timberlane II).
255. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 600-01.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 610. The Timberlane I court concluded that the Alcoa effects test was
an inadequate formula for determining when the antitrust laws should be applied
overseas. Id. at 611-12. In particular, the court reasoned that the Alcoa test. failed to
take into account the interests of other nations or the relationship between the liti-
gants and the United States. Id. at 612.
258. Id. The court explained the necessity of this third, "interest-balancing" prong as
follows:
That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation's borders
does not mean that it embraces all, however. Extraterritorial application is
understandably a matter of concern for the other countries involved. Those
nations have sometimes resented and protested, as excessive intrusion into
their own spheres, broad assertions of authority by American courts. Our
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Thus, in addition to decidng whether the foreign conduct has "some"
actual or intended effect,o the court must also weigh at least seven
factors that examine the regulatory interests of other nations in compari-
son to U.S. regulatory interests.2 The seven factors are:
[1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, [2] the nationality or alle-
giance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corpora-
tions, (31 the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, [4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere, [51 the extent to which there is explicit purpose
to harm or affect American commerce, [6] the foreseeability of such effect, and
[71 the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad."
courts have recognized this concern and have, at times, responded to it, even
if not always enough to satisfy all the foreign critics. In any event, it is evi-
dent that at some point the interests of the United States are too weak and
the foreign harmony incentive for restrain too strong to justify an extraterri-
torial assertion of jurisdiction.
Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
259. The Timberlane I court split the "effects" aspect of the Alcoa test into two
prongs: The first prong requires proof that the defendant's conduct had "some ef-
fect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce." Id. at 613. The second
prong requires that the magnitude of these effects be sufficient to amount to a "civil
antitrust violation, i.e.. conduct that has a direct and substantial anticompetitive ef-
fect." Id. In Timberlane II, the court observed that the plaintiff's alleged "ability and
willingness to supply cognizable markets with lumber" in competition with the defen-
dant, satisfied the first prong of the test. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). The court further noted that the plaintiff's
complaint, alleging a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from milling lumber in Hon-
duras for export to the United States, stated a cognizable injury, thus satisfying the
second prong of the test. Id.
260. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976). In the court's words, the pur-
pose of the third interest-balancing prong is to determine "whether the interests of,
and links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on American
foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify
an assertion of extraterritorial authority." Id. at 613.
261. Id. at 614. The "interest-balancing" aspect of this approach mirrors the ap-
proach taken in the choice of law area, otherwise known as governmental interest
analysis. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969). Under govern-
mental interest analysis, courts weigh
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular is-
sue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies under-
lying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.
Id.
This interest balancing approach parallels the balancing approaches adopted in the
personal jurisdiction and the forum non conveniens context. See discussion supra
notes 40-109 and accompanying text (in personam jurisdiction) & notes 116-29 and
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The court justified its so-called "rule of reason" on the doctrine of inter-
national comity, emphasizing the need for courts to respect "the preroga-
tives of other nations.
21
The court then remanded the case for application of the rule of rea-
son, and the lower court dismissed the action on the grounds that the
assertion of jurisdiction would offend the comity and fairness prong of
the test.2 ' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, supplying its own
version of how the "fairness" test should be applied to the particular
facts."' The factors that seemed to weigh most heavily against jurisdic-
tion were the degree of conflict between enforcement of U.S. antitrust
law with the foreign law or policy and the insignificant effects that the
alleged anticompetitive conduct had on U.S. commerce.' In stark con-
trast to U.S. antitrust law, Honduran laws permitted competitors to make
agreements restricting or dividing commercial activity." Thus, the en-
forcement of United States antitrust law would lead to a significant con-
flict with Honduran law and policy. "' The court also observed that the
accompanying text (forin non conveniens).
262. Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d at 612. International comity, or the comity of nations,
is generally defined as one nation's unilateral recognition of the laws or judicial acts
of another nation, arising out of a sense international duty and convenience. Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 191 (1895); Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United
States District Court. 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.27 (1987); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
267 (6th ed. 1990).
263. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
264. Id. at 1384. In Timbeilane II, the Ninth Circuit engaged in de novo review of
the district court's comity analysis. Id. Other circuits, classifying the issue as a mat-
ter of law, have taken the same approach. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007. holding
reinstated, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) (explaining
that application of interest balancing is a question of law and thus subject to de
novo review). But see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir.
1980) (arguing that such an approach is an abuse of discretion).
265. Timberlane 11, 749 F.2d at 1383-84. The court seemed to lay special emphasis
on the degree of conflict with foreign law and policy, indicating that a significant
conflict with foreign law and policy, "unless outweighed by other factors in the comi-
ty analysis, is itself a sufficient reason to decline the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at
1384. Compare Timberlane II, 749 F.2d at 1384, with In re Insurance Antitrust Litig.,
938 F.2d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1991) (extending antitrust laws overseas to activities of
various British insurance companies in Britain even though the court perceived a con-
flict between U.S. and British law), affd 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
266. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d at 1384.
267. Id.
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actual effect of Timberlane's potential operations on United States for-
eign commerce was insubstantial when compared with the effects of its
activity in the Honduran lumber market. -5 Moreover, the allegedly un-
lawful acts occurred solely on Honduran territory."' While factors such
as the nationality of the parties and the enforceability of any U.S. judg-
ment rendered pointed in favor of jurisdiction, these factors did not out-
weigh the high potential for conflict with Honduran economic policy and
the minimal effect the alleged violations had on U.S. foreign com-
merce. 
2 70
Timberlane's rule of reason was heartily adopted by scholars drafting
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.-7' Sections 402 and 403 of the third Restatement set forth, in es-
sence, a two-step approach justifying the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction in a manner closely tracking the Timberlane model.27 2 Section
402 first sets out the traditional basis of prescriptive jurisdiction under
public international law: (1) the territoriality principle; (2) the effects
doctrine; (3) the nationality principle; and (4) the protective principle.7"
Even where jurisdiction can be found under section 402, section 403
further requires that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.27 4 Rea-
sonableness is determined by considering "all relevant factors," in-
268. Id. at 1385. "During the years 1970 through 1972, the amount of lumber im-
ported from Honduras expressed as a percentage of total United States lumber im-
ports was [never in excess of .1%]." Id.
269. Id. at 1334.
270. See id.
271. See RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TILE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TILE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987) (citing Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976)).
272. Id. §§ 402-03.
273. Id. § 402. The Restatement explains:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interest in things, present within its terri-
tory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of
other state interests.
Id.
274. Id. § 403. The reasonableness requirement works as a limitation on the exten-
sion of prescriptive jurisdiction in much the same way as the reasonableness require-
ment in judicial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. United States, 480 U.S.
102, 113 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
see also supra notes 40-76 and accompanying text.
275. Id. § 403(2). The Restatement explains:
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cluding the location of the challenged conduct, the effects in the regulat-
ing state, the nationalities of the parties, the importance of the regulation
to the regulating state, the likelihood of conflict with another state's
laws, and the extent to which the regulation is consistent with, and im-
portant to, the international system.27'
Section 415 of the Restatement applies section 403's reasonableness
requirement in the antitrust context. 7 Section 415 permits U.S. anti-
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under §402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreason-
able is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including where
appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the terri-
tory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activ-
ity, between the regulating state and the person principally respon-
sible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international. political, le-
gal, or economic system;
(0 the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulat-
ing the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as
well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all
the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other
state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
Id.
276. See id. Like the Timberlane analysis, the Restatement's approach closely paral-
lels the governmental interest balancing of modern (lay choice of law analysis. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
277. See RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
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trust law application to: (1) anticompetitive conduct that occurs entirely
or partially within the United States; 79 (2) conduct that occurs outside
the United States but has some intended effect on U.S. Commerce;"
and (3) any other anti-competitive conduct that does not fall within (1)
or (2) if there is a substantial effect on U.S. commerce "and the exercise
of jurisdiction is not unreasonable."" The accompanying comment a
makes clear, however, that "[all exercise] of jurisdiction under this sec-
tion is subject to the requirement of reasonableness" as set forth in sec-
tion 403.'
The Department of Justice's 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations also adopted Timberlane's comity-based
approach to the extraterritorial reach of antitrust law. ' The Guidelines
listed six factors to be considered by the Department in determining
whether to bring an antitrust lawsuit:"' 1) comparison of the relative
significance of the conduct within the United States as compared to
conduct abroad; 2) nationality of the parties; 3) whether a purpose to
affect U.S. commerce existed; 4) relative significance and foreseeability
of effects on the U.S. as compared to effects abroad; 5) reasonable ex-
STATES § 415 (1987). Section 415, entitled "Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive
Activities," provides:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in
the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade
that is carried out in significant measure in the United States, are subject to
the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, regardless of the nationality
or place of business of the parties to the agreement or the participants in
the conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made out-
side of the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such
trade that is carried out predominantly outside the United States, are subject
to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of
the conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United
States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are
subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agree-
ments or conduct have substantial effect on the commerce of the United
States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
Id.
278. Id. § 415(1).
279. Id. § 415(2).
280. Id. at § 415(3) (emphasis added). Comment (a) notes that subsections (2) and
(3) are intended to be consistent with case law since Alcoa. Id. § 415 cmt. a.
281. Id.
282. See 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supro note 233, at 21595.
283. Id. For in depth commentary on the 1988 Guidelines, see generally Wilbur L.
Fugate, The New Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Ite-na-
tional Operations-A Reflection of Reagan and, Perhaps, Bush. Administration Anti-
trust Policy, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 295 (1989).
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pectations furthered or defeated by the antitrust action; and, 6) the de-
gree of conflict with foreign law or policy."4
In Congress, the Timberlane approach was recognized, but not ad-
mired so much as to be legislated. When Congress enacted the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982,' it left unchanged courts'
discretion to consider international comity in exercising jurisdiction.'
A Senate Bill introduced in 1987, however, intended to amend the FTAIA
by codifying a "jurisdictional rule of reason," similar to that proposed by
Timberlane. Section 103 of the bill listed six factors for the courts to
rely on in determining whether to dismiss an action:
(1) (Tihe relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the
United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on
the United States as compared with the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeat-
ed by the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic poli-
cies.'
As of yet, Congress has not mandated such an approach on the
courts.'
284. 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21595.
285. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
286. See H.R. REP. No. 686. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) ("If a court determines
that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the FTAIAJ would have
no effect on the court['s] ability to employ notions of comity ...or otherwise to
take account of the international character of the transaction.").
287. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1987). An earlier version of the bill pro-
posed to eliminate the treble damage remedy in antitrust suits brought against foreign
defendants. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1985). Senate bills 572 and 397 are dis-
cussed in detail in Note, Reassessment of International Application of Antitrust
Laws: Blocking Statutes, Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 197, 213-19 (Summer 1987).
288. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1987). The bill excluded some obvious
political factors contained in other tests, such as that proposed by Mannington Mills,
thus inviting courts to consider the possible effect on foreign relations if jurisdiction
were exercised. Compare Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297 (3rd Cir. 1979) with S. 572. 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1987).
289. The Senate bill was more recently reintroduced as S. 50, and entitled the "For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1989." S. 50, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Senator DeConcini expressed the underlying purposes of the bill:
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Congressional indecisiveness in adopting a balancing test has not dis-
couraged a number of federal circuits from following Timberlane.'
Some courts have modified the balancing test either by adding additional
factors or by tailoring existing ones to enhance the accuracy of the anal-
ysis in weighing the respective interests. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp.," for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit declared that one of the factors it would evaluate was the
"[plossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief.""2 Other circuits, by contrast, have not ventured so
far into the foreign relations arena, perhaps intentionally limiting them-
selves simply to evaluating the "relative importance" 3 or "degree of
conflict"2' between U.S. and foreign law."
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has had a significant ad-
verse impact on the climate for international trade and investment by U.S.
firms. U.S. companies are currently caught between a rock and a hard place.
They face the demands of domestic antitrust law and the opposing pressure
of the international marketplace for cooperative agreements .... This bill
will provide for more harmonious legal rules for international trade, and put
U.S. business on more equal footing in international trade and commerce.
135 CONG. REC. S289-301. S344 (1989) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
290. See, e.g. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (fol-
lowing the factors enumerated in Timberlane), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 3034 (1993);
O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 457 (2d Cir.
1987) (same), cert. denied 488 U.S. 923 (1988); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) (same). But see Laker Air-
ways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting the interest balancing approach adopted by Timberlane); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (same).
291. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
292. Id. at 1297. The approach in Mannington also differed from Timberlane by
first deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction existed under the effects test, and
then deciding whether jurisdiction should be exercised by looking at factors of inter-
national comity. Id. at 1297-98; accord Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct.
2891, 2909 n.24 (1993) ("[Cloncerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a
court has determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act juris-
diction.") (citations omitted). Timberlane, by contrast, combined effects and interna-
tional comity as a single question of prescriptive jurisdiction. Timberlane I 549 F.2d
597. 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976); accord lartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("It is evident from what I have said that the Court's comity analysis, which
proceeds as though the issue is whether the courts should 'decline to exercise . . .
jurisdiction,' rather than whether the Sherman Act covers this conduct is simply mis-
directed.").
293. See Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614.
294. See id.
295. The comity analysis introduced by the Ninth Circuit, and in particular the test
adopted by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, explicitly considering the foreign
relations impact of asserting jurisdiction, has been criticized as a violation of the "po-
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Regardless of which test is adopted, the policy justification for adopt-
ing an "interest-balancing" approach is always the same: portrayal of an
atmosphere of judicial fairness and respect for foreign sovereign interests
in light of the modern realities of international commerce." Ironically,
however, despite the quick popularity of the comity analysis, courts have
rarely used the doctrine to divest themselves of jurisdiction." This is
largely due to the courts' inherent tendency to discount the strength of
the foreign regulatory interests involved. ' In those few cases where in-
terest-balancing was employed to favor a foreign jurisdiction, the anti-
competitive effects on United States commerce were either non-existent
or speculative.' In essence, therefore, courts are merely paying "lip
litical question doctrine." See Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in In-
ternational Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 485-86 (1993). For further discussion of this and other criti-
cisms, see infra notes 37641 and accompanying text.
296. Mannington Mills, Inc., v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir.
1979). The court observed: "When foreign nations are involved, however, it is unwise
to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial
power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or
decline jurisdiction." Id. at 1296. See also Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661
F.2d 864, 869-71 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Pacific Seafarers,
Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1093 (1969).
297. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909-10 (1993); In re
Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932-34 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 113 S. Ct.
3034 (1993), Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-
51 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290-91 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-
56 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296
(3d Cir. 1979); Wells Fargo & Co, v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431 (9th
Cir. 1977); Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc., v. Communications Satellite
Corp., No. 89 Civ. 5021, 1993 WL 97313, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Daishowa Int'l v.
North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Dominicus
Amercana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y 1979).
298. See, e.g., Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d at 1255-56. This tendency was
most accurately discussed by Judge Wilkey in Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-54,
when he explained that "courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance com-
peting foreign interests." Id. at 954; see also Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. CowI'. L. 579 (1983).
299. See, e.g., National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n. 666 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d
Cir. 1981) (finding that effects were not sufficiently anticompetitive to come within
purview of antitrust laws); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Arnax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870
(10th Cir. 1981) (where effects where found to be "speculative and insubstantial'),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Vespa of Am. Corp. v. Baj Auto Ltd., 550 F.
Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding no effects); Conservation Council of W.
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service" to the comity factors, because once it is determined that there is
no effect on U.S. commerce, interest-balancing is no longer necessary.:'
It appears that as long as there is more than a de minimis United States
regulatory interest, courts have refused to allow interest-balancing to
defeat an otherwise legitimate antitrust claim."'
a. Hartford Fire: The Supreme Court's most recent treatment of
comity in legislative jurisdiction
The waning influence of comity and interest-balancing in limiting the
jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law was most recently apparent in Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California," in which the Supreme Court af-
firmed, 5-4, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to
reinsurers in London."' In Hartford Fire, nineteen states and numerous
private parties brought antitrust suits against foreign reinsurers in Lon-
don alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act in conspiring to
coerce primary insurers in California to eliminate pollution liability cov-
erage." The defendants conceded that their conduct was intended sub-
stantially to affect the U.S. insurance market, therefore establishing a
minimal basis for jurisdiction."" They contended, however, that interna-
tional comity barred the application of U.S. antitrust law.""
In Hartford Fire, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision to
apply the Sherman Act to the foreign defendants." 7 The Court first reaf-
firmed the long standing "effects" doctrine with a reference to American
Banana, noting that "although the proposition was perhaps not always
free from doubt ... it is well established by now that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States."' Applying this
doctrine to the present case, the Court affirmed that the Sherman Act
reached British defendants who allegedly "engaged in unlawful conspira-
cies to affect the market for insurance in the United States."'"
Austl. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp. 270, 275-76 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (finding no
effects).
300. Lakm Airways, 731 F.2d at 950-51.
301. See sup)a note 297 (citing cases).
302. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
303. Id. at 2911.
304. Id. at 2908.
305. Id. at 2909 n.21.
306. Id. at 2909. In particular, the defendants argued that since their conduct was
perfectly consistent with British law and policy, applying the Sherman Act in this in-
stance would "conflict significantly with British law." Id. at 2910.
307. Id. at 2911.
308. Id. at 2909 (citations omitted).
309. Id. at 2909 (citations omitted).
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As to the defendants' argument that international comity dictated
against the exercise of jurisdiction, the Court, although recognizing that
comity has its place in jurisdictional analysis, held that the friction be-
tween U.S. and British law did not rise to a level necessary to invoke
comity concerns."" The Court noted that, in enacting the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, Congress did not intend to affect courts'
ability to employ notions of comity to limit the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act. "' However, even if the Court were to apply comity
analysis, "[it] would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the
circumstances alleged here."" '
The Court then proceeded to engage in its own comity analysis, and
surprisingly applied a test entirely different from that proposed in
Timberlane or the third Restatement. The Court boiled the comity analy-
sis down to one simple question: "whether 'there is in fact a true conflict
between domestic and foreign law."' :  The court concluded that there
was no "true conflict,"" ' reasoning that although English law permitted
the defendants' conduct, it did not prohibit the defendants from comply-
ing with U.S. antitrust law."' Defendants could have complied with the
310. Id. at 2910.
311. Id. ("'If a court determines that requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are
met, [the FTAIA] would have no effect on the court['s] ability to employ notions of
comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international character of the trans-
action.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686)).
312. Id.
313. Id. (quoting Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States District
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting)).
314. Id. Although not citing Timbealne, the Court found only one factor in the
Timberlane interest balancing approach was worth discussing-the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy. See id.; Timbermane I, 549 F.2d 597, 615. (9th Cir. 1976).
In Timbeilane II, the Ninth Circuit also stressed the importance and perhaps domi-
nant nature of this factor "A conflict, unless outweighed by other factors in the co-
mity analysis, is itself a sufficient reason to decline the exercise of jurisdiction."
Timberlane II, 749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
This factor is also mentioned in the Restatement as "the likelihood of conflict with
regulation by another state." RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(h) (1987).
315. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910 (citing RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1987) (stating that no conflict
exists "where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws
of both"). The court also cited comment j of § 415, which specifically addresses the
prescriptive jurisdiction of antitrust laws. Id. ("ITlhe fact that conduct is lawful in the
state in which it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United States
antitrust laws." RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
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law of both countries, therefore making the comity analysis unneces-
sary.;I" The Court did not consider any other factors in its comity
analysis. :"7
The Ninth Circuit's opinion, in Hartford Fire, by contrast, thoroughly
examined all the Timberlane factors."" Nonetheless, in keeping with
the majority of other courts that have employed the balancing test, the
court refused to permit "comity" to defeat an otherwise legitimate anti-
trust claim."" The court found all but one factor, the degree of conflict
with foreign law,"' pointed in favor of jurisdiction.:" The crucial point
of the court's analysis was the resolution of the second factor of the
Timberlane analysis-the nationality or allegiance of the parties." The
court deftly diminished the importance of the foreign nationality of many
of the defendants by noting that although some of the defendant corpora-
tions are located in London, some are subsidiaries of U.S. corpora-
tions." Thus, on balance, the court concluded that "the presence of the
American plaintiffs, many American defendants and some American sub-
sidiaries is a factor pointing towards the exercise of jurisdiction.""'
STATES § 415 cmt. j. (1987)).
316. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, criticized the Court's narrow definition of conflict
as unsupported by existing law. See id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to
earlier Supreme Court cases and academic commentary in the area of choice-of-law,
a "conflict" exists in those circumstances "[w]here applicable foreign and domestic
law provide different substantive rules of decision to govern the parties' dispute." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on Conflicts of Laws,
2-3 (1980); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 1 cmt. c, illus. (1934)). Un-
der this broader approach, a conflict may exist and foreign interests may be consid-
ered, even if the defendants are not compelled by any foreign law 1o take actions
that violate American law. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. Justice Scalia noted that the Court failed to examine the comity factors of
§ 403(2) and instead relied exclusively on comments to §§ 403(3) and 415 of the Re-
statement. Id. at 2922 n.11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also noted that the
Court failed to consider the express directive in § 415 that "[any exercise of [legisla-
tive] jurisdiction under this section is subject to the requirement of reasonableness
set forth in § 403(2)." Id. at 2922 n.ll (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
(TIlIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES, § 415 cmt. a 1987)).
318. In re Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932-34 (9th Cir. 1991).
319. Id.
320. Unlike the Supreme Court, the district court and Ninth Circuit found that the
application of U.S. antitrust laws "would lead to significant conflict with English law
and policy." Id. at 933. The court reached this conclusion based on an amicus brief
filed by the British government that quoted several regulations specifically exempting
certain insurance services from domestic antitrust laws. Id. at 932-33.
321. Id. at 933-34.
322. See id. at 933.
323. Id.
324. Id. The appellate court's attribution of the domestic subsidiary's contacts to the
foreign parent, which the Supreme Court seemingly approved, contradicts prevailing
doctrines of in personamn jurisdiction. See supra notes 40-109 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to both the Supreme and appellate court decisions, Justice
Scalia employed interest-balancing to reach the opposite conclusion in
his dissent. 121 Using the third Restatement factors, 126 Justice Scalia
found that the comity-analysis led away from application of U.S. law.' 7
In examining the contacts, Justice Scalia noted that the relevant activity
occurred "primarily" in the United Kingdom, and that the defendants
were British corporations and subjects "having their principle place of
business or residence outside the United States."' Justice Scalia found
the Ninth Circuit's argument that foreign interests were diminished be-
cause some of the British corporations were U.S. subsidiaries improper:
"In effect, the Court of Appeals pierced the corporate veil in weighing
the interests at stake." 32 Moreover, with respect to the importance of
the regulation to the regulating states, Justice Scalia found that Britain,
had a comprehensive regulatory scheme in the reinsurance area. Given
the significant exceptions in antitrust law Congress has carved out for
state insurance regulation, Britain argued Justice Scalia, had the superior
regulatory interest."' Justice Scalia concluded that the assertion of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and therefore, that antitrust
law should not reach these foreign defendants."'
b. Analysis of Hartford Fire
The Court's decision, while not attempting to express a view on the
validity of comity-based interest-balancing, 2 effectively rejected the
doctrine by applying a comity analysis that significantly differed from
Timberlane, the third Restatement, or those proffered in the various
circuits. In the Court's view, the comity analysis consists of one question:
is there a direct conflict between U.S. and foreign law so that the defen-
Under either an alter ego or agency theory, the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary
relationship alone is not enough to confer jurisdiction. Antitrust Litig.. 938 F.2d at
933; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2921 n.10 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2920-21 (Scalia. J., dissenting).
326. Justice Scalia chose the more exhaustive analysis of § 403 of the Restatement
because, in his view, the standard best reflected the Court's decisions in construing
international choice-of-law principles. Id. at 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
328. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2921 n.10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 2910.
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dant is required by the foreign state to engage in illegal conduct.' : ' In
adopting this narrow test, the Court cited Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence in Socidtd Nationale v. United States District Court." A summa-
ry of the majority and concurring opinion in Socidt4 Nationale is neces-
sary to understand the nature of the Court's comity analysis.
Socidtd Nationale asked whether federal courts are bound to apply the
Hague Evidence Convention as the exclusive means of discovery be-
tween U.S. litigants and litigants in nations that are treaty partners.:"
Defendants, two French corporations that sought to invoke the Conven-
tion, argued, inter alia, that international comity mandated the treaty's
application before the parties could turn to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. " The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the Convention was
not mandatory and that international comity did not support a blanket
rule of first resort to the Convention. In the Court's view, the princi-
ple of comity requires a more "particularized analysis of the respective
interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation."":
The court cited section 437(1)(c) of the 1986 tentative draft of the
third Restatement as a guide to the factors relevant to comity
analysis." ' Section 437, which was intended to govern discovery be-
tween U.S. and foreign litigants, proposed that courts consider a balanc-
ing of interests similar to that proposed by Timberlane.0 For example,
among other factors, courts should consider "the extent to which non-
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine impor-
tant interests of the state where the information is located."'
"
'
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's individualized-interest
balancing approach to the comity analysis."2 In his opinion, such an ad
hoc approach invited analysis that courts were neither capable nor com-
petent to make."' He found courts generally "ill-equipped" for case-by-
case balancing of sovereign interests because of a lack of information to
333. Id.
334. 482 U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
335. Socidtd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 524.
336. Id. at 543.
337. Id. at 543-46.
338. Id. at 543-44.
339. Id. at 544 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF




342. Id. at 554 (Blackrmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
343. Id. at 551-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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balance accurately government interests."' Secondly, balancing would
typically result in parochial bias because courts unfamiliar with foreign
interests cannot give them adequate weight.: ' Finally, the individualized
approach, by second-guessing government interests, ignores compromises
made in the treaty-making process and thus invades the exclusive do-
main of the executive and legislative branches. : " '
In Justice Blackmun's opinion, international comity would best be
served by general presumption that the Convention procedures should
control. 7 A balancing approach, by contrast, should only be employed
when "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law.""' Only then should a court balance "foreign interests, the interests
of the United States, and the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning international legal regime."' 9 The existence of the Hague
Convention eliminated direct conflicts between procedural rules of the
member countries, and therefore there was no need to resort to comity
principles."' The best result, in Justice Blackmun's opinion, in terms of
both international comity and predictability in litigation, was to find a
general presumption favoring use of the Convention."I
Justice Blackmun's view of the comity analysis was adopted in whole
by the Court in Hartfovd Fire."2  According to the Court, there is no
344. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
345. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
346. Id. at 551-52 (Blackmun, J.. concurring and dissenting).
347. Id. at 548-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
348. Id. at 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
349. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun modeled his
comity analysis on the choice-of-law principles of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws. See id. at 555 n.ll. Section 6 provides that, absent any statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law, a court should consider seven factors in deciding
the applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue.,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
350. Socidtd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
351. Id. at 568 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
352. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993).
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need to balance interests unless a "true" or direct conflict exists between
domestic and foreign law."' The Court, however, took a narrow view of
the term "conflict" not expressed in Blackmun's dissent: it held that what
is required is a situation in which the illegal conduct of the defendants is
not just permitted, but is required by the foreign state. " For support,
the Court relied on comment e of section 403 and comment j of section
415, which it interpreted as setting out a precondition that the regula-
tions of the two states be in direct conflict before the balancing of inter-
ests provided in section 403(2) could apply."" As Justice Scalia correct-
ly observed, the Court erroneously interpreted those provisions." Com-
ment e of section 403, entitled "Conflicting exercises of jurisdiction," is
directed exclusively to section 403(3), which is intended to apply only in
those cases in which "it would not be unreasonable for each of two
states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescrip-
tions by the two states are in conflict. "13. 7 As the first clause of subsec-
tion (3) makes abundantly clear, it applies only after a court has deter-
mined that the exercise of jurisdiction "would not be unreasonable" for
both states." Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable can be
answered only by first applying the eight-factor balancing test provided
in subsection (2), which must be analyzed in every circumstance, even
when the two regulations are not in conflict."' Comment d of section
403 supports this interpretation by noting that the "[e]xercise of jurisdic-
tion by more than one state may be reasonable-for example, when one
state exercises jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality and the other on
the basis of nationality .... In such situations, the [balancing] factors in
subsection (2) apply to both states.""' Comment a of section 415 also
provides that "[any exercise of jurisdiction under this section is subject
to the requirement of reasonableness."'""
Moreover, Justice Scalia noted, the term "conflict" as it is traditionally
understood in the field of conflicts-of-law, encompasses more than sim-
ply cases of where the regulations of two states impose inconsistent
obligations on the parties, but also any case where the applicable sub-




356. See id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




360. Id. § 403 cmt. d.
361. Id. § 415 cmt. a.
362. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2922 (1993) (Scalia, J..
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choice-of-law analysis, known as governmental interest methodology, the
term "true conflict" is not given the narrow definition adopted by the
Court. As modernly used, "true conflict" exists when foreign and domes-
tic law cannot be reconciled, not only because the laws are different on
their face, but because the policy interests behind them are opposed.'
When, however, the court finds that local and foreign policies are the
same, there exists a "false conflict," and local law will apply despite the
facial differences between the two laws.'
Applying this definition of "true conflict" to the Court's in the Hartford
Fire case, it is apparent that the Court's analysis was misguided. Instead
of examining the substantive policies behind the British insurance law, as
modern conflicts analysis requires, the Court focused solely on the obli-
gations imposed on the face of the British statute and found no "true
conflict." As the Ninth Circuit noted, the policy behind British insurance
law relied on by the defendants was to exempt specifically certain insur-
ance services from antitrust liability and to encourage indirectly the
defendants' anti-competitive conduct."" By contrast, U.S. insurance reg-
ulations, although exempting some anticompetitive conduct in insurance
services, did not seek to immunize the defendants' activities." As a re-
sult, there is a significant conflict between English and U.S. law and
policy, and therefore, a "true conflict.""
Had the Court found a conflict, as it arguably should have, a comity
analysis would have been necessary. Even under the approach of Justice
dissenting) (citing RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 2-3
(1980)); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 cmt. c, illus. (1934)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 2 cmt. a and illus. (1969) (choice-of-
law analysis occurs whenever a suit involves "foreign elements").
363. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 92 (4th ed. 1984);
WILLIS L. REESE, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 488 (9th ed. 1990).
Professor Brainerd Currie first proposed this technique of identifying "true conflicts"
in his article Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 178 (1959); see also BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TIlE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1963). Currie's approach has gained considerable ground in United States
courts, but has come under fire from other conflicts scholars as circular and easily
manipulated to achieve a predetermined result. See generally Robert A. Leflar, True
"False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 B.U. L. REV. 164 (1968); Peter K. Westen, False Con-
flicts, 55 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1967).
364. See REESE, ET AL., supra note 363, at 487-88.
365. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1991).
366. Id. at 928.
367. See id. at 933; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2921
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun's concurrence in Socidtd Nationale, the analysis would consist
of weighing "foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and the
mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international
legal system."'" As Justice Scalia noted, if the Court had properly ap-
plied the test it adopted, Britain's significant interest in this case clearly
outweighed U.S. interests so that legislative jurisdiction would be unrea-
sonable."
c. The impact of Hartford Fire on interest balancing
Given the problems with the Court's analysis of the comity issue, the
precedential effect of Hartford Fire will probably be slight. The court
indicated that it did not intend to rule out the lower court's use of comi-
ty factors, but only to reverse the appellate courts' conclusion that there
was substantial conflict between U.S. and British law.'" On the conflict
issue, it appears that the Court prefers a narrow definition of the term
"conflict" that closely resembles the scope of the "foreign sovereign com-
pulsion" defense. This defense, recognized in most U.S. courts, immuniz-
es a defendant from the extraterritorial application of U.S. law only if the
conduct sought to be prohibited is required by foreign law.37 Although
the justification for limiting the "conflict" factor to this narrow scope is
unclear, the practical effect is certain. It will result in more expansive
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, 7' and perhaps, as Justice
Scalia predicts, raise protests from U.S. trading partners.:'7' Whether or
not this effect is desirable is a separate question that will be discussed in
Part IV below.
2. Another Comity-Based Limitation: Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
The doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion, like the comity analysis,
is a judicially-created tool that limits the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
law.74 It applies, however, only in those situations in which the conduct
368. Soci6t Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. United States District Court, 482
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
369. See Hartfo?l Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2921 (Scalia J., dissenting).
370. See id. at 2910. The Court clearly left untouched the ability of lower courts to
consider other factors in determining whether they should abstain from jurisdiction
on comity grounds: "Iwle have no need in this case to address other considerations
that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds
of international comity." Id. at 2911.
371. BORN & WESTIN. supra note 16, at 623-31. For further discussion of the foreign
sovereign compulsion defense, see iafra 374-81
372. See HartJbr Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2920 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 2922 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
374. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
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sought to be prohibited is required by foreign law.:' The doctrine is
thus far narrower in scope than the Timberlane analysis, which purports
to apply to all cases that involve foreign interests. The courts employing
the doctrine justify its use on grounds of international comity and no-
tions of territorial sovereignty.?r In Interamerican Refining Co. v. Tex-
aco Maracaibo, Inc.,"' the district court noted:
It requires no precedent ... to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the right to
regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice,
firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts
of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States
courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive
practices of persons and corporations."'
Additionally, courts must interpret the Sherman Act to adapt to the
§ 441(1) (1987).
375. Id.; ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 28, §§ 8.14-8.23; BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 16, at 623-31. Section 1 of the Third Restatement provides:
(1) In general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that. is prohibited by the law of that
state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by
the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a
national
RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TilE UNITED STATES, § 441(1)
(1987). The Justice Department formally recognized the doctrine in its 1988 INTERNA-
TIONAL GUIDELINES. See 1988 Iterntionl Guidelines, supra note 234, at 21596 ("The
Department will not prosecute anticompetitive conduct that has been compelled by a
foreign sovereign.").
376. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292-94
(3d Cir. 1979); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. 1291. 1298
(D. Del. 1970). These same concerns underlie the policies behind the act of state
doctrine prohibiting U.S. courts from tjudging the validity of the public acts of foreign
sovereigns within their own territory. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 416 (1964); see generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 647-738.
377. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
378. Id. at 1298. In Interamerican, two Venezuelan corporations, entered into a se-
ries of transactions in which plaintiff purchased crude oil from defendant and then
exported the oil for refining in the United States. Id. at 1292-93. After a few initial
transactions, the defendants allegedly refused to sell additional oil to plaintiff because
the government of Venezuela prohibited such sales. Id. at 1293. The plaintiff brought
suit under the Sherman Act, alleging an illegal boycott. Id. at 1292. The district court
held that defendants were compelled by Venezuelan authorities to boycott the plaintiff
and that such compulsion was a complete defense to an action under the antitrust
laws based on that boycott. Id. at 1303-04.
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realities of international business. For example, multinational corpora-
tions must often comply with foreign business regulations far different
from our own as a condition of doing business overseas. If the Sherman
Act were extended to impose liability for obedience to foreign law, the
result would be to punish multinational corporations by limiting their
choices as to where to do business'
Although the foreign sovereign compulsion defense appears to be an
attractive escape device from U.S. antitrust law, the doctrine's applica-
tion is limited. Courts have employed the doctrine only when foreign law
requires the corporation to engage in certain activity that would be
deemed anti-competitive at home.:"' Moreover, most authorities hold
that this defense does not apply to conduct or sales occurring in the
United States."'
E. Criticism of Comity-Based Interest Balancing in the Courts
Numerous criticisms have been aimed at the balancing test introduced
by Timberlane and expanded by the third Restatement.' One common
objection is unpredictability in that the test fails to assign any priority to
the various factors or to the relevance of additional factors."" This
379. Id. at 1298.
380. The foreign government's mere recognition or approval of private conduct does
not amount to the "compulsion" necessary to evoke the doctrine. See. e.g., Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (holding that
the Canadian government's appointment of a corporation as its exclusive purchasing
agent did not "compel" the corporation to monopolize production and sales). Also
excluded are cases in which the antitrust defendant invited compulsion by requesting
the foreign government to compel it to take certain actions to gain antitrust immuni-
ty. See Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1297 (suggesting that foreign sovereign com-
pulsion would not be available if defendants had procured the government order not
to sell to the plaintiffs).
381. See. e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (finding
jurisdiction despite existence of foreign legislation granting the defendant a monopoly
when the conspiracy was entered into and overt acts performed in the United
States); Linseman v. World Iockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324-25 (D. Conn. 1977)
(noting that the doctrine "shields only conduct which is perpetrated within the ...
foreign country"); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 263
(N.M. 1980) (determining that an Aamerican company is not immunized from U.S.
antitrust laws even if compelled by a foreign state to act, as long as that action is
adverse to trade within the U.S.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); see also RESTATE-
MENT (TIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES § 441 cmt. b
(1987).
382. See, e.g., Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the Interational Application of the
Sherman Act: Encour-aging Courts to Enter the Political Arena. 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 130 (1982); Garvey, supra note 295: James M. Grippando. Declining to Exercise
Extraterritorial Antitrust Jur-isdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Ille-
gitiviate Ectension oJ the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983).
383. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 16, at 613; Garvey, supra. note 295, at 485. Even
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problem is particularly evident when different factors point in different
directions. Moreover, evaluating the factors may strain judicial resources
because doing so involves significant judicial fact-finding, including evalu-
ation of complex and controversial political information, if such informa-
tion is even available."' In general, critics, many of them judges, argue
that courts lack the expertise and institutional capacities to ascertain the
questions of national interests and foreign relations that certain factors
of section 403 raise." ' For example, how are judges to assess such fac-
tors such as "the importance of the regulation to the international politi-
cal, legal, or economic system? " "'
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia most aptly
discussed these cirticisms in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines. 7 In Laker Airways, the British airline filed an antitrust
action against U.S. and European airlines alleging that the defendants
conspired to drive Laker out of the North Atlantic market." Several
European defendants obtained anti-suit injunctions in English court
against Laker's U.S. antitrust action."" The defendants relied in part on
the British Protection of Trading Interests Act-a blocking statute pro-
hibiting persons conducting business in England from complying with
the Third Restatement concedes that under its balancing approach "[no priority or
other significance is implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not all con-
siderations have the same importance in all situations; the weight to be given to any
particular factor or group of factors depends on the circumstances." RESTATEMENT
(TIIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. b. (1987).
384. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing the inherent difficulty with balancing contradictory fac-
tors).
385. See Garvey, supra note 295, at 485-86; Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824
F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Laker Airways. 731 F.2d at 949; Reinsurance Co. of
Am. v. Administration of State Insurance, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148
(N.D. Il. 1979). On interest balancing, Judge Easterbrook remarked:
I would be most reluctant to accept an approach that calls on the district
judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and then slice and dice to taste.
Although it is easy to identify many relevant considerations, as the ALI's
Restatement does, a court's job is to reach judgments on the basis of rules
of law rather than to use a different recipe for each meal.
Reinsurance Co., 902 F.2d at 1283 (Easterbrook, J.. concurring).
386. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2)(e) (1987).
387. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
388. Id. at 917.
389. Id. at 918.
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certain foreign judicial or regulatory provisions."' Laker sought counter-
injunctions in the United States to prevent the remaining defendants
from obtaining similar English anti-suit injunctions.;'
The district court granted the counter-injunctions and the defendants
appealed, arguing in part that "international principles of comity" pre-
clude issuance of the U.S. injunctions. ' - The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the antitrust laws could properly be exercised against the
European defendants and that the U.S. injunction would stand.;' Ac-
cording to the court, the United States' assertion of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion in this case was justified under the "effects" doctrine.: ' Citing
Alcoa, the court acknowledged that in the antitrust context, the
defendant's conduct must be intended to produce and result in substan-
tial effects in the United States. ' Here, the defendants' alleged predato-
ry pricing of fares and other conduct was "designed specifically to drive
Laker out of business and eventually to raise the fares paid by transatlan-
tic passengers, the bulk of whom are American."3" The court observed
that English courts also had prescriptive jurisdiction, but that the exis-
tence of concurrent jurisdiction, as a general rule, did not require a court
to curtail its own jurisdiction. :7 In the court's view, international comi-
ty, albeit an important doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence, does not require a
court to ignore domestic interests.' Where Congress has enacted laws
to proscribe certain anticompetitive conduct, the use of any discretionary
390. Id. at 920.
391. Id. at 918-19.
392. Id. at 921.
393. Id. at 915.
394. Id. at 922. "The prescriptive application of United States antitrust law to the
alleged conspiracies between KLM, Sabena. and the other antitrust defendants is
founded upon the harmful effects occurring within the territory of the United States
as a direct result of the alleged wrongdoing." Id. These effects included the negative
impact of the predatory pricing conspiracy on American consumers traveling to Eu-
rope as well as Laker's principle creditors which were American. Id. at 924. In addi-
tion, the court added, to the extent that the defendant airlines had landing rights in
the United States and conduct their business in the United States, they have subject-
ed themselves to the regulation of U.S. laws. Id. at 925.
395. Id. 925; see also sup-a notes 214-40 and accompanying text.
396. Laker Ai -ways, 731 F.2d at 925.
397. Id. at 926.
The sufficiency of jurisdictional contacts with both the United States and
England results in concurrent jurisdiction to prescribe. Both forums may le-
gitimately exercise this power to regulate the events that allegedly transpired
as a result of the asserted conspiracy .... The mere existence of dual
grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction does not oust either one of the regulating
forums.
Id.
398. Id. at 937.
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doctrine to prevent that application would "amount to an unjustified eva-
sion of United States law injuring significant domestic interests.""' '
In the case of U.S. antitrust law, "Il]egitimate United States interests in
protecting consumers ... and regulating economic consequences of
those doing substantial business in our country are all advanced under
the congressionally prescribed scheme.'' Moreover, despite Congres-
sional awareness of the controversy surrounding the assertion of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over foreign entities, Congress has not sought to
limit that reach except to require that the effects on U.S. export trade be
"direct, substantial and foreseeable."" In the court's view, the fact that
the defendants invoked the British Protection of Trading Interests Act,
intended specifically to cancel out the effective enforcement of U.S. anti-
trust law, only heightens the court's duty to carry out the policies enact-
ed by Congress."'
Given the direct conflict in regulatory interests between the two states,
the court explained, any attempt at interest balancing as suggested by
Timberlane or the third Restatement would be improper.""' While the
399. Id. at 938. However. an exception lies in those limited circumstances when the
defendant falls under the category of "foreign sovereign compulsion." See id. at 953-
54 (discussing courts' inability to review conduct falling within the act of state or
sovereign immunity doctrines). Under the sovereign compulsion defense, the party is
forced to violate the law of one nation to comply with that of another. See supra
notes 374-81 and accompanying text. Because this exception is easily identified and
applies only in a limited context, it arguably should be retained as a legitimate es-
cape from the application of domestic laws.
400. Laker Airwrays, 731 F.2d at 945-46.
401. Id. at 946 (citing the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 96
Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a & 45(a) (1982)). For more
detailed commentary on the FI'AIA, see supra notes 233-36 & 286.
402. Laker Ahways, 731 F.2d at 945-46. The court most aptly described the conflict
as follows:
[Tihe government of the United Kingdom is now and has historically been
opposed to most aspects of United States antitrust policy insofar as it affects
business enterprises based in the United Kingdom. The British Government
objects to the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction invoked to apply the
antitrust laws; the substantive content of those laws, which is much more
aggressive than British regulation of restrictive practices; and the procedural
vehicles used in the litigation of the antitrust laws, including private treble
damage actions, and the widespread use of pretrial discovery. These policies
have been most recently and forcefully expressed in the Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act.
Id. at 946.
403. Id. at 948.
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court did not dismiss the propriety of balancing government interests
altogether when domestic and foreign interests are not inconsistent,"' it
sharply criticized the balancing process in several respects. First, factors
such as "the extent to which another state may have an interest in regu-
lating the activity" and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other
states""' are inherently difficult to quantify with any accuracy, and in
the end, will fail to persuade a court to choose a single jurisdiction."'
Second, the court explained, those factors that "do purport to provide a
basis for distinguishing between competing bases of jurisdiction...
generally incorporate purely political factors which the court is neither
qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balanc-
ing."" 7 The court specifically referred to the impossibility of evaluating
"'the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted,"'""8 a factor put forth by the third Restatement. This is be-
cause the courts cannot question "desirability of antitrust law." In the
court's words, "An English or American court cannot refuse to enforce a
law its political branches have already determined is desirable and neces-
sary.""' Similarly, requiring a court to weigh the "'importance of the
regulation to the regulating state,"' is an improper invitation for judicial
activism.""
We are in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regulation
or nonregulation to the United States and the United Kingdom. It is the crucial
importance of these policies which has created the conflict. A proclamation by
judicial fiat that one interest is less "important" than the other will not erase a
real conflict."'
The court also doubted whether domestic courts could realistically be
404. Id. at 948 n.144 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Some balancing or recognition of
latent conflict of laws, would seem judicious to reconcile the separate but not incon-
sistent national interests.")). Judge Wilkey's "recognition" of balancing interests in cer-
tain contexts seems less than genuine. It is difficult to see how balancing would be
more appropriate in a context when the interests are consistent than when they are
opposed. It is precisely in those contexts, where sovereign interests point against
each other, that there exists what is known in the choice-of-law arena as a "true
conflict." See supra notes 347-69 and accompanying text. In no other context would
balancing seem to be more appropriate.
405. See RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES, § 403(2)(g) & (h) (1987).
406. Laker Ainvays, 731 F.2d at 949.
407. Id.
408. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNIT-
ED STATES, § 403(2)(b) (1987)).
409. Laker Aiwavoys, 731 F.2d at 949 (emphasis omitted).
410. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNIT-
ED STATES, § 403(2)(c) (1987)).
411. Id.
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expected to weigh domestic and foreign policies impartially.2
Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster comity,
domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals. Domestic
courts are created by national constitutions and statutes to enforce primarily na-
tional laws. The courts of most developed countries follow international law only
to the extent it is not overridden by national law. Thus courts inherently find it
difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt,
national interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests. This partially
explains why there have been few times when courts have found foreign interests
to prevail." '
Finally, the court attacked the legitimacy of the balancing approach,
noting that in addition to "intensified" scholarly criticism against its
use,4"' "[c]ourts are increasingly refusing to adopt the approach.""'
Therefore, because of its inadequacy and questionable validity as a
means of resolving the conflicting regulatory interests, the court refused
to adopt the balancing test."6
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court, in citing Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Socidtd Nacional within Hartford Fire, indi-
rectly approved the foregoing criticisms. As discussed above, Justice
Blackmun's rationale in rejecting a case-by-case interest balancing ap-
proach mirrors that of Judge Wilkey's in Laker Airways. 7
F. Recent Pronouncements of Congress and the Executive:
Current Trend Toward More Vigorous Extraterritorial Enforcement
In addition to the waning influence of "comity" as an accepted limita-
tion to prescriptive jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's permissive
attitude towards the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law, there are
412. Id. at 949-50.
413. Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted).
414. Id. at 950 (citing Grippando, supra note 382, Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of
Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Am. J. CoMp. L. 1 (1984); Kadish, supra
note 382; Maier, supra note 298; James A. Rahl, International Application of Ameri-
can Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 362-64
(1980)).
415. Id. (citing National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d
Cir. 1981); In 7e Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)).
416. Id.
417. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) and compare
Socidt6 Nationale Industreille Adrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 551-55 (1987) (Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909. 949-51 (D.C. Cir.
1984). See supra notes 302-73 and accompanying text.
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signs from the Clinton Administration that the Justice Department will
vigorously pursue international antitrust enforcement.
International antitrust policy in the Reagan and Bush years was gener-
ally consistent with Timberlane's cautious approach toward the extrater-
ritorial application of antitrust law. This is reflected in the Justice
Department's 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International Opera-
tions," which attempted to bring enforcement policy up to date with
antitrust decisions then in force." The Guidelines stated that "[tihe
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws is not limited solely to conduct and trans-
actions that occur within the United States.""' As for the potential
reach of antitrust law, the Department adopted a milder version of the
Alcoa doctrine, stating that the effects on U.S. commerce must be "di-
rect, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable."' "' In addition, the Guide-
lines adopted six factors, like those introduced by Timberlane, which the
Department would consider in determining whether to bring an antitrust
lawsuit." The Guidelines' reserved approach, however, was most ap-
parent in the statement that the Department would not enforce the
Sherman Act unless there was a U.S. consumer interest at stake.23 As a
result, the Department denied protection to U.S. exporters victimized by
collusive foreign buyers.424
The Clinton Administration's stance toward international antitrust
enforcement appears far more aggressive than in previous administra-
tions.42 First on the list of priorities of newly appointed Assistant Attor-
ney General Anne Bingaman was the enhancement of international anti-
418. 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21584.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 21594.
421, Id. at 21595. This was the version of the effects test adopted by the ALI in
drafting section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations law of the Unit-
ed States. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES supra note 44, § 18. The Restatement (Third), by contrast, relied an effects
test requiring only "substantial effects" subject to the reasonableness balancing test in
section 403. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES, § 415(3).
422. 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21595.
423. Id. This cautious approach reflects "the only time in U.S. history that the Jus-
tice Department has restricted itself to initiate extraterritorial antitrust suits only
when there are adverse effects on U.S. consumers." Erperts Foresee Increased tromi-
nence of Internatilonal Issues in Enforcement, [Jan-June] 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1556, at 316 (Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Experts].
424. New Leniency Policy May Spur Criminal Docket, 3 No. 10 Dep't of Just. Alert
4 (Aug. 16, 1993) [hereinafter DOJ Alert].
425. Bingaman Details Division Priorities in Inter-national Antitrust Enforcement,
[July-Dec.] 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1637. at 568 (Oct. 28, 1993)
[hereinafter Bingaman]; Experts, supra note 423.
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trust enforcement." " In public statements, Ms. Bingaman stressed in-
creased cooperation with foreign governments in gathering evidence
against anti-competitive conduct abroad427 These efforts are expected
to lead to negotiations for bilateral agreements facilitating the exchange
of information between U.S. and foreign government enforcers.4 21 In a
further show of the Department's intention to step up international en-
forcement, Ms. Bingaman stated that she would no longer follow the
restriction in the 1988 International Guidelines limiting Sherman Act en-
forcement to cases in which a U:S; consumer interest is at stake."- This
statement only reinforced an earlier Justice Department pronouncement
on April 3, 1992, that it would begin to enforce antitrust law on the basis
of harm to United States exports, irrespective of whether or not there is
harm to U.S. consumers. ' The result is a more aggressive stance
against anticompetitive activity abroad, particularly price-fixing cartels
overseas that threaten U.S. exporters.'" The Justice Department did
note, however, that it would continue to consider "principles of interna-
tional comity when making antitrust enforcement decisions that may
significantly affect another government's legitimate interests. ' ,e
Congress has also recently introduced legislation enhancing the extra-
territorial bite of antitrust law. The bill known as the International Fair
Competition Act of 1993, would create a cause of action against any
426. Bingaman, supra note 425.
427. Id. at 569.
428. DOJ Alert, supra note 424.
429. Id.; see also 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 233, at 21595.
430. See Lori B. Morgan & Helane S. Rosenbaum, Recent Developments, U.S. De-
partment of Justice Antitrust En(forcement Policy, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 192, 192
(1993) (citing U.S. Dep't of Just. Pub. No. 92-117, Justice Department Will Challenge
Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under Antitrust Laws 1 (1992) [hereinafter DOJ
Release]).
431. DOJ Alert, supra note 424.
432. See Morgan & Roasenbaum, supra note 430, at 197 (citing DOJ Release, at 3)
("The DOJ's intention to respect foreign sovereignty is borne out by the new 1992
policy statement in which the DOJ agrees to notify and consult with foreign govern-
ments in antitrust proceedings.").
433. S. 99, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Act's general purpose is to "combat
foreign cartels that are exploiting American producers and consumers." 139 CONG.
REC. S195-02, S534 (1993) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). In introducing the bill,
Senator Metzenbaum made specific reference to a "Japanese price-fixing cartel for
consumer electronics that operated in our markets in the 1960's and 1970's." hd.
The cartel included the biggest brand names in the business such as
Matshushita, Hitachi, Sony, Sharp, and Sanyo. There is strong evidence that
this cartel used the monopoly profits that it earned in Japan by fixing high
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foreign entity engaged in a cartel or monopoly that exports goods to the
United States and sells them below cost."" The bill, if enacted, would
have a serious effect on extending existing antitrust law concerning pred-
atory-pricing to entities in foreign countries, particularly Japan, where
price-fixing cartels are an entrenched way of life.""
V. WHAT SHOULD TiIE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY
LOBBY FOR AS A SOLUTION?
With the increasing extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust law,
U.S. and foreign firms operating abroad must reassess the risks and ben-
efits of antitrust litigation. This task, however, is made unusually difficult
by the wide differences in opinion among federal circuits on the precise
reach of antitrust law and whether international comity will be used in
limiting that reach. The recent Supreme Court decision discussing anti-
trust prescriptive jurisdiction utterly failed to clarify or reconcile existing
approaches.3 " Rather than expend resources on researching and litigat-
ing in this state of confusion, U.S. business should perhaps exert greater
efforts in lobbying Congress for the passage of a legislative solution to
the jurisdictional problem. There are a variety of possible approaches,
from creating a statutory presumption favoring jurisdiction to calling for
bilateral or multilateral agreements that harmonize domestic and foreign
law.
A. Theoretical Goal-Predictability
Above all, the approach chosen should meet the specific concerns of
the business and international community. First and foremost, it should
be predictable so that multinational and foreign entities can take into
account the risks of litigation in their business planning. To ensure such
predictability, there must be a uniform standard imposed by the legisla-
ture and applied by the courts in all antitrust cases.
prices to subsidize below cost selling in this country. Their U.S. competitors,
who could not collude or fix prices, were driven out of business by the car-
tel.
Id.
434. Id. Under the bill, private firms, U.S. antitrust authorities and consumers may
bring suit upon a showing that "goods were sold in [U.S.] markets at a price below
the manufacturer's cost and were exported from a home market that is closed to
international competition because it is carlelized or monopolized." Id.
435. Id. at S535.
436. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
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B. Treaties
Predictability and certainty would be most effectively served if bilater-
al or multilateral treaties governed all assertions of extraterritorial juris-
diction. Such agreements would spell out with precision the cases in
which United States antitrust law would apply and would ensure foreign
enforcement agencies cooperation in the discovery process. In addition,
by calling on the respective nations' regulatory agencies to cooperate in
fact-finding and enforcement, the regulatory process could make substan-
tial gains in effectiveness. Treaties provide a unique opportunity to merge
existing rules into a harmonized, predictable structure that would serve
the interests of all parties-both public and private entities.
Currently, the United States has entered into several cooperative agree-
ments with other countries, including Canada, Australia, Germany, and
the European Community."' The E.C.-U.S. agreement "Regarding the
Application of Their Antitrust Laws," for example, provides for notifica-
tion of enforcement activities that may affect important interests of the
other party," and most importantly, the exchange of information, co-
operation, and coordination of enforcement activities.' 9 In the event
that the enforcement activities of one party appear to "adversely affect
important interests of the other Party," the treaty requires the antitrust
authorities to engage in an interest-balancing analysis similar to that
proposed by section 403 of the third Restatement."" Comparative law
437. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, E.C.-U.S., reprinted in 30 I.L.M 1487, 1499-1501
(1991); Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Applica-
tion of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 23 IL.M. 275,
278-79 (1984); Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982,
U.S.-Austl., 34 U.S.T. 388; Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Re-
strictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G.. 27 U.S.T. 1956, 1958-59; Alford.
supra note 242. at 44-49; Chang, supra note 32, at 309-19.
438. E.C.-U.S. Antitrust Agreement, supra note 437, at 1493.
439. Id. at 1499-1500, 1495-96.
440. Id. at 1499-1500. The factors to be considered, "in addition to any other factors
that appear relevant in the circumstances," include:
(a) the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of con-
duct within the enforcing Party's territory as compared to conduct with-
in the other Party's territory;
(b) the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in
the anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, suppliers, or competi-
tors within the enforcing Party's territory;
(c) the relative significance of the effects of the anticompetitive activities on
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scholars note that the convergence of antitrust policy in the United
States and Europe will reduce regulatory conflict and probably make
unnecessary the balancing of interests the treaty required. 4' One such
significant development abroad was the EEC's promulgation in 1989 of
merger control rules reversing earlier policy, which under U.S. merger
standards, was considered anticompetitive.4 '
The North American Free Trade Agreement also seeks to facilitate
cooperation between Mexican, U.S., and Canadian antitrust authorities.
Article 1501, entitled "Competition Law," imposes general obligations on
member nations of enforcement and cooperation in antitrust matters:
1. Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-competitive
business conduct, and shall take appropriate action with respect thereto ....
2. Each Party recognizes the importance of cooperation and coordination
among their authorities to further effective competition law enforcement in the
free trade area. The Parties shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforce-
ment policy, including mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and ex-
change of information relating to the enforcement of competition laws and pol-
icies in the free trade area.""
Articles 1502 and 1503 of the treaty specifically immunize certain gov-
ernment and privately owned monopolies that are designated by the
state, but impose obligations on members to control and supervise such
entities so that such monopolies do not adversely affect other mar-
kets." Probably the most significant step toward cooperation lies in
article 1504, which establishes a trilateral Working Group on Trade and
Competition "to report, and to make recommendations" on "relevant
issues concerning the relationship between competition laws and policies
the enforcing Party's interests as compared to the effects on the other
Party's interests;
(d) the existence or absence of reasonable expectations that would be fur-
thered or defeated by the enforcement activities;
(e) the degree of conflict or consistency between the enforcement activities
and the other Party's laws or articulated economic policies; and
(f) the extent to which enforcement activities of the other Party with re-
spect to the same persons, including judgments or undertakings resulting
from such activities, may be affected.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987).
441. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?; A
Comment on Professor Bilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 39, 46
(1987) (noting the convergence of United States and foreign substantive policies, in-
cluding antitrust and insider trading).
442. For a detailed discussion of these Guidelines, see generally Otto Sandrock &
Elke van Arnheim, New Merger Control Rules in the EEC, 25 INT'L L. 859. 860
(1991).
443. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1501.
444. Id. arts. 1502, 1503.
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and trade in the free trade area."" ' The findings and recommendations
of the Working Group must be submitted to the treaty's Trade Commis-
sion by 1998.4"
Although the cooperative agreements mentioned above are a step in
the right direction, they serve only to reduce the likelihood of conflict,
not eliminate it. Notification, communication, and careful consideration
of sovereign interests by antitrust authorities will discourage, but cannot
prevent, overreaching by U.S. antitrust authorities, nor will they eliminate
the imposition of inconsistent antitrust obligations on entities abroad.
Commentators, therefore, propose that the treaties be amended with
rules that allocate jurisdiction among the interested nations." Another
suggestion is to exempt foreign entities from the specter of treble damag-
es in private antitrust suits."' Because treble damages are regarded as a
principle catalyst for international antitrust disputes and retaliatory legis-
lation by other nations," elimination of this remedy could reduce much
existing conflict."
As the foregoing illustrates, existing treaties have not yet solved the
problems of conflicts in extraterritorial application of antitrust law. In
the meantime, unilateral legislative and judicial solutions must be consid-
ered.
445. Id. art. 1504.
446. Id. The Free Trade Commission, a trilateral body established by the treaty, was
created to supervise NAFrA's implementation, modification and interpretation. Id. art.
2001 (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures).
447. Chang, supra note 32, at 313; Diane P. Wood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in An-
titrust Law: A Comment on Ordover and-Atwood, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Sum-
mer 1987 at 179, 182 (discussing hierarchical rules which give top priority to the
"country where the activities took place," then to "the country that wishes to pre-
scribe rules for its nationals," and finally to "the country wishing to protect itself
against adverse effects from abroad").
448. Chang, supra note 32, at 315-18.
449. For commentary on the various "blocking statutes" enacted to forestall U.S.
antitrust enforcement, see supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
450. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 32, at 315-18. But see Note, Reassessment of Inter-
national Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes, Balancing Tests, and
Treble Damages, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1987, at 197, 216-18 ("ITIhe
disincentives [to private litigants] associated with a detrebling scheme may damage
the U.S. policy of punishing anticompetitive conduct that has direct. substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effects in the United States.").
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C. Choice-of-Law Approach
Some scholars propose that courts view prescriptive jurisdiction as
essentially a choice of law problem.""' Under such an approach, judges
would apply modem conflicts rules, like those expressed in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, to choose foreign or domestic
law.4 '2 The second Restatement instructs courts to choose the law of
the forum with the "most significant relationship" to the occurrence and
the parties.'' Section 6 then provides seven choice-of-law factors to be
weighed in determining which forum has the most significant relation-
ship. These include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those estates in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations.
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law.
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied."
The above principles are then applied to the facts of each case, taking
into account the parties' contacts and relationship with the forum.4 '
451. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER. supra note 252. at 446; Andreas Lowenfeld, Public
Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, Inteumational Law and Some Sug-
gestions for Their Interaction, 163 R.C.A.D.1. 311, 328-29 (1979); Born, supra note 19,
at 81-94.
452. Born, supra note 19, at 88-89; see also Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1802-03
(categorizing § 403 of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law as an example
of a "choice-of-law" approach).
453. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(1), 188(1) (1971)
(covering tort and contract scenarios respectively). Other modem choice-of-law theo-
ries include governmental interest analysis, discussed supra, notes 342-69 and accom-
panying text. For a brief survey of other theories see REESE, ET AL., supra note 363,
at 485-95.
454. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
455. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2), 188(2) (1971)
(tort and contract scenarios, respectively). Subsection 2 of § 145 provides:
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred.
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred.
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.
Id. § 145(2).
1300
[Vol. 21: 1219, 19941 Antitrast Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Proponents of this approach contend that by considering the aggrega-
tion of contacts between the parties and the relative policy interests at
stake, a fair and predictable result will occur.4  Moreover, that under
such an analysis, U.S. law would only be applied where domestic regula-
tory interests are objectively greater, and would ultimately reduce the
likelihood of foreign protests.' 7
These appraisals, however, overlook the inherent limitations of a
choice-of-law analysis when applied to the prescriptive jurisdictional
setting. First, conflict of law analysis, while admittedly less likely to in-
vade the sensitive issues of foreign relations, fails to bring any greater
degree of predictability than the balancing approach of Timberlane and
the third Restatement. Indeed, this is not surprising because the balanc-
ing approach adopted by the drafters of section 403 of the third Restate-
ment was modeled after the analysis proposed in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws."'
Second, choice-of-law rules are too limiting because they choose the
law of one nation-and only one nation-to govern a particular event or
transaction. It is clear, however, that public international law recognizes
the possibility of "concurrent jurisdiction" where both nations may legiti-
mately claim control of the defendant's activity. ' The third Restate-
ment explicitly recognizes that states may legitimately exercise concur-
rent jurisdiction consistently with international law. " ' Adopting a
456. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, su pra note 252, at 446; Lowenfeld. supra note 451.
at 328-29; Born, supra note 19, at 87.
457. Born, supra note 19, at 86-88.
458. Born, supra note 19, at 84; Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1802-03; see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); see also Margaret Holthusen, U.S.
Courts: Walking the Tightrope Between American Trade Interests and International
Comity-Do the Factors Presented in Section 403 of the Restatement (Thilrl) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States Facilitate the Determination of Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction of United States Antitrust Law?, 4 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 60 (1991);
HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCIIOLES, HANDBOOK OF TIlE CONFLICT OF LAWS
168 (4th ed. 1964).
459. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines. 731 F.2d 909, 952 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (citing M. WIIITEMAN, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218-19 (1965)).
460. RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES
§ 403 cmt. d (1987). Comment d, entitled "Reasonable exercise of jurisdiction by
more than one state," provides in relevant part:
Exercise of jurisdiction by more than one state may be reasonable-for ex-
ample . . . when one state exercises jurisdiction over activity in its territory
and the other on the basis of the effect of that activity in its territory ....
The fact that one state has exercised jurisdiction with respect to a given
choice-of-law analysis would further limit the reach of U.S. law in ad-
dition to the existing limitations imposed by international law."" This
could result in leaving a significant amount of anticompetitive activity to-
tally unregulated-a result that the legislature could not have intended.
Third, in the antitrust context, it is questionable whether choice-of-law
rules can be legitimately used to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction."'
Most choice-of-law rules, including the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, are premised on the notion that "[a] court, subject to constitution-
al restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice
of law." ''Li Only when there is no clear statutory directive to apply do-
mestic law are courts permitted to proceed to choice-of-law analysis.'
Although most United States antitrust statutes are silent as to their terri-
torial reach,"' courts,4"' as well as the executive"7 and legislative
branches,6" have repeatedly construed the statutes to apply to both do-
mestic and extraterritorial activities. 4' This special treatment stems
from the notion that when economic regulation such as antitrust law is
being asserted, the domestic "interests" are of a higher order than when
local rules of contract or tort are invoked.7
person or activity is relevant . . but is not conclusive that it is unreason-
able for the other state to do so.
Id.
461. See Born, supra note 19, at 88 (noting that the choice-of-law notion of "most
significant relationship" would preclude jurisdiction in far more cases than the comity
analysis employed in § 403 of the Third Restatement).
462. See Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1818-19.
463. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
464. Id. § 6(2).
465. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 204-40 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 418-32 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
469. See Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1819.
470. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 955
(1984); Harold G. Maier, Extrateritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersec-
tion Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 289
(1982); Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1819. The Laker Airways court, in analyzing the
"heightened" nature of conflict between British and American antitrust laws, noted
that
[tlhe conflict in jurisdiction we confront today has been precipitated by
the attempts of another country to insulate its own business entities from the
necessity of complying with legislation of our country designed to protect
this country's domestic policies. At the root of the conflict are the fundamen-
tally opposed policies of the United States and Great Britain regarding the
desirability, scope, and implementation of legislation controlling anticom-
petitive and restrictive business practices.
No conceivable judicial disposition of this appeal would remove that
underlying conflict.
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Therefore, because a choice-of-law approach does not adequately ad-
dress the unique nature of the sovereign interests at stake in the antitrust
context, and because it also has the same disadvantages of
unmanageability and unpredictability as the Timberlane/Restatement
analysis, other models must be considered.
D. Rebuttable Presumption Favoring Jurisdiction
Perhaps the best way to ensure predictability in result and accord due
weight to domestic regulatory interests is to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption favoring jurisdiction." The presumption would be raised up-
on showing that the anticompetitive conduct, wherever it occurred, had a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" effect on United States
commerce."' This standard would be met, for example, when the for-
eign corporation has engaged in anticompetitive activities aimed at U.S.
producers or consumers. The burden of proof would then shift to the
defendant corporation to show that Congress did not intend the Sherman
Act to apply to this particular transaction or conduct. The presumption
would be rebutted, for example, if the defendant corporation were able
to show that the provisions of a bilateral treaty exempted the allegedly
anticompetitive activity, or if it could establish a defense under the act of
state, foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, or sovereign immunity doc-
trines.473 Comity analysis, like that proposed in Timberlane or in the
third Restatement, would not be available. Any foreign protests resulting
from the conflict caused by the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law would
have to be resolved via the diplomatic process.
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 955.
471. See Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1805. 1816-19 (discussing the efficacy of a
presumption of jurisdiction).
472. This modified "effects" test is consistent with precedent upholding the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993) (noting that there must be some "substantial effect" in
the United States) (emphasis added). It is also consistent with the standard set forth
by Congress in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988) (effect on U.S. commerce must be "direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable"). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 415(2) (1987) (requiring only that the agreement or conduct
have "some" effect on U.S. commerce). Comment a of § 415 of the Restatement de-
fines "some effect" as "not insignificant." Id. at § 415 cmt. a.
473. For discussion of courts' modern treatment of the act of state and sovereign
immunity doctrines see generally Garvey, supra note 295, at 463-82.
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1. Procedural and Substantive Reasons for Adopting
a Presumption Favoring Jurisdiction
Procedurally, this model would be superior to a balancing test in sev-
eral ways. Balancing, while purporting to promote fairness by taking into
account the interests of all the parties, is highly unpredictable."' This
uncertainty results from both the difficulty in accurate measurement of
the factors, and the ease with which courts can manipulate certain fac-
tors to arrive at a predetermined result they feel is "fair" in a particular
case."' These difficulties in balancing were discussed thoroughly in
Laker Airways.47" In particular, Judge Wilkey noted that such factors as
"the importance of the regulation to the regulating state" or "the likeli-
hood of conflict with regulation by other states" are both practically
impossible to quantify and can be easily distorted to reach a conclusion
favoring jurisdiction." The weighing of so many factors also consumes
precious judicial resources in the discovery and the decision making
processes.4 7' Adopting a simple presumption in favor of jurisdiction, by
contrast, reduces the ambiguity of the prescriptive jurisdiction issue.
Corporations can count on being responsible for their anticompetitive
conduct, which is intended to and does in fact harm U.S. commerce. In
turn, litigation on the issue will be reduced and the judicial process
streamlined as courts and parties are forced to recognize a uniform and
simplified jurisdictional standard."'
Substantively, an approach presuming jurisdiction accords with the
realities of modern international business and congressional intent. Cor-
porations are increasingly "going international" with their services and
products. The trend is not just in trade but also in foreign direct invest-
ment, which has taken the form of joint-ventures, wholly-owned subsid-
iaries or branch offices abroad. Given the increased interdependence, it
is clear that business activities abroad can have enormous domestic
consequences. Accordingly, U.S. antitrust authorities should be con-
cerned with global rather than national activities. '
474. See Note, supra note 23, at 1323-25.
475. See generally Garvey, supra note 295 at 482-91.
476. See discussion of Laker Airways. Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984), supra notes 387-417 and accompanying text.
477. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d at 949
(D.C. Cir. 1984). Such distortion is most evident in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hartford Fire, in which Justice Souter concluded that "no true conflict existed" be-
tween British and American law, despite provisions in British insurance regulations
that permitted London reinsurers to engage in activity that would be labeled
anticompetitive under American law. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California. 113 S.
Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993).
478. Laker Air-ways, 731 F.2d at 950.
479. Id.
480. Born, supra note 19, at 62-63. The legitimacy of extraterritoriality is substan-
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As for congressional intent, it is undisputed that Congress intended
U.S. antitrust law to apply to anticompetitive conduct abroad having
significant effects in the United States.' The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly confirmed this view.82
2. The Loss of International Comity
The absence of comity factors from the foregoing analysis is essential.
Predictability will be furthered as a result. Indeed the goals of comity
themselves will also be furthered. In its present form, the doctrine of
international comity is a non-doctrine. While many courts have sought to
avoid international conflict by referring to comity, in reality the doctrine
is almost never employed to divest a court of jurisdiction." ' This
feigned embrace of comity probably does more harm to U.S. foreign rela-
tions than an approach paying no attention to the interests of foreign na-
tions." '
Additionally, from a constitutional perspective, it is doubtful that
weighing foreign government interests is a suitable task for U.S.
courts.' A well-known constitutional restraint on a court's ability to
tiated not just by American case law, but by foreign and public international law as
well. Id. at 69-70; see also discussion supra notes 176-80 and infra notes 495-507 and
accompanying text.
481. See discussion of Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text; see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 94546.
482. See, e.g, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. .2891, 2909 (1983) ("[Ilt
is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6
(1986) ("The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when
the conduct has an effect on American Commerce.") (citing Continental Ore. Co. v.
union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962)).
483. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 951. As Judge Wilkey explained, courts are in-
herently incapable of weighing domestic and foreign interests evenly. Id.
Despite the real obligation of courts to apply international law and foster
comity, domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals.
Domestic courts are created by national constitutions and statutes to enforce
primarily national laws. The courts of most developed countries follow in-
ternational law only to the extent it is not overridden by national law. Thus
courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign inter-
ests.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Born, sup-a note 19, at 95 ("[T]he charge of parochial
bias is both over-broad and, as yet, not established by the evidence.").
484. Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1817.
485. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 955: Garvey, supra note 295, at 485-86 (dis-
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consider foreign policy implications is the "political question doctrine,"
which holds that certain difficult and sensitive issues are "nonjusticia-
ble," or more appropriately decided by the executive or legislative
branches. " The primary reason for taking these questions away from
the judiciary is that courts lack "the necessary informational resources,
the ability to adjust to diplomatic nuance and timing, and the remedial
resources to respond to the international political dynamic."87
Accordingly, the relevant indicia of a nonjusticiable political question
are (1) the issue involves resolution of questions omitted by text of the
Constitution to other coordinate branches of government; (2) the resolu-
tion of the question demands that the court move beyond areas of ju-
dicial expertise, for instance, when there is a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving the issue; and (3) other
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention." No-
cussing the impracticality and questionable validity of the comity balancing test);
Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1817 (same).
486. Baker v. Cam 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). While every case that touches on for-
eign relations is not a nonjusticiable political question, those questions which "fre-
quently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a
discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature," should be avoided
by the judiciary. Id. The doctrine derives from the separation of powers principle,
which recognizes that each branch has a limited and sometimes exclusive sphere in
which to exercise authority. Id. Foreign relations, for example, is most often within
the realm of the executive and legislative branches. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(Congress's exclusive right to regulate foreign commerce; to define and punish offens-
es against the Law of Nations); art. II, § 2 (granting the executive's treaty making
power); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-17, (1965) (noting executive authority over
matters of foreign affairs); Chicago & Southern Air lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 114 (1948) (stating that the nature of executive decisions as to foreign poli-
cy is political rather than judicial, and such decisions are outside the domain of judi-
cial inquiry).
487. Garvey, supra note 295, at 462 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964)); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949-50 ("Given the inherent
limitations of the Judiciary, which must weigh [the balancing factors) in the limited
context of adversarial litigation, we seriously doubt whether we could adequately
chart the competing problems and priorities that inevitably define the scope of any
nation's interest in a legislated remedy.").
488. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (stating that the relevant indicia of a nonjusticiable political
question are: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issue; (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" (4) the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made:" or (6) "the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
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where are the foregoing indicia more pronounced than in the comity
analysis adopted by the third Restatement and the court in Timberane.
First, the texts of Articles I and II of the United States Constitution make
clear that resolving international conflict and conducting foreign relations
are within the exclusive realm of the executive and legislative branch-
es.'"' Second, by curtailing the legitimate reach of U.S. law, thereby re-
ducing the executive's leverage in negotiating treaties to harmonize ex-
traterritorial enforcement, a comity analysis diminishes the respect due
to those coordinate branches of government.' Third, such factors as
"the importance of the regulation to the regulating state .... the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accept-
ed .... [and] the existence of justified expectations that might be pro-
tected or hurt by the regulation,"' are demonstrably unmanageable le-
gal standards for resolving controversies. 112 Finally, if the general intent
of the political question doctrine is to prevent judicial overreaching, it
should certainly apply to an analysis that essentially grants judges a dis-
cretionary veto-power over the otherwise legitimate reach of U.S. law.""'
Thus as a practical matter, and perhaps even as a constitutional mat-
ter, the comity analysis and its weighing of political immeasurables is
better left to the diplomatic rather than the judicial process. '
tion").
489. See supra note 486.
490. Weintraub, supra note 31, at 1817.
491. RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TiE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2)(c)-(d) (1987).
492. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909. 948-50
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("We are in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of
antitrust regulation or nonregulation to the United States and the United Kingdom.");
see also Garvey, supra note 295, at 485-86; Weintraub, suprn note 31, at, 1817. But
see Alford, supra note 242, at 14-15 (arguing that the comity approach satisfies the
standards of justiciability).
493. See genmeally Garvey, supra note 295 (noting the general trend of U.S. courts
in international civil litigation to engage in foreign policy-making which arguably vio-
lates the separation of powers). But see Born, supra note 19, at 96-97 (arguing that
the courts' use of comity factors of § 403 of the Third Restatement is not in reality
an intrusion into political or foreign policy issues, but rather the identification of
"true" conflicts between the laws of different, nations).
494. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 955.
Absent an explicit directive from Congress, this court has neither the au-
thority nor the institutional resources to weigh the policy and political factors
that must be evaluated when resolving competing claims of jurisdiction. In
contrast, diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition, designed to
exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which accompany the realiza-
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VI. CONCLUSION
A presumption favoring jurisdiction, free of the comity analysis, is the
best way to ensure predictability for the international community without
interfering with the legitimate reach of U.S. antitrust law.
Opponents of a presumption of jurisdiction unimpeded by comity con-
siderations will claim that such an approach will bring the Sherman Act
into sharp conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries, partic-
ularly our closest trading partners Admittedly, such an expansive ap-
proach may eventually lead to retaliation. Following the adoption of the
Alcoa effects doctrine in the U.S., foreign legislatures enacted "blocking
statutes" to hamper U.S. antitrust actions on their soil."" There are sev-
eral reasons, however, for believing that such retaliation is less likely to
occur now than before.
First, America's largest trading partners, including the European Eco-
nomic Community,"" NAFTA members,""' and Japan, 9' have adopted
tion of national interests within the sphere of international association. These
forums should and, we hope, will be utilized to avoid or resolve conflicts
caused by contradictory assertions of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
495. See Born, supra note 19, at 88.
496. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text (discussing foreign reaction to
the use of the "effects" doctrine in U.S. courts).
497. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, which sets forth the basic rules on competition law among its member states,
are directly analogous to sections one and two of the Sherman Act. See Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 4748 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988). Article 85
prohibits "any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations...
[and] concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition with the Common Market." EEC Treaty, suppra, art. 85. Article 86, aimed
at monopoly conduct, provides that "action by one or more enterprises to take im-
proper advantage of a dominant position within the Common Market or within a
substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market
and shall hereby be prohibited." EEC Treaty, supra, art. 86.
In the EEC equivalent of Alcoa, the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties in the Wood Pulp Case adopted a rather strong version of the "effects" doctrine.
Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Com-
mission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988). Specifically, the Court held that
EEC competition laws applied to overseas activity of non-EEC entities conspiring to
fix prices affecting EEC consumers. Id. at 524344; see also Grosfillex-Fillistorf, 1964
J.O. (58) 915, 3 C.M.L.R. 237 (1964) (earlier holdings by the European Commission).
For further commentary on the development of Antitnst law in the European Com-
munity, see generally Alford, supra note 242, at 27-37.
498. Canadian antitrust legislation has closely tracked that of the United States.
Canada's first antitrust statute, enacted in 1889, prohibited contracts, trusts, and com-
binations formed in restraint of trade. An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of
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aggressive antitrust laws similar to our own. Indeed, the standards set in
U.S. antitrust law have proven a model for many developing nations." '
Second, significant areas of antitrust enforcement have been covered
by treaty mechanisms that limit the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
among treaty members, and provide measures for dispute resolution in
the event a conflict in policies arises. '
Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, R.S.C., ch. 41 (1889). The regulation of
monopolies and mergers began in 1910. Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. 9
(1910). Legislation enacted in 1986 substantially updated Canadian antitrust law and
established a specialized Competition Tribunal. Competition Act, C.R.C. ch. 34 (1985).
See generally Christopher J. Maule & Thomas W. Ross, Canada's New Competition
Policy, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 59 (1989); Craig Marquiz, 77te North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement & The Extraterritorial Application of United States Anti-
trust Legislation: A Proposal for Change, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 146 n.24
(1993).
Although, article 28 of the Mexican Constitution provides that "there shall be no
monopolies or restrictions to free competition of any kind," antitrust enforcement has
not been a top priority of the Mexican government. Marquiz, supra, at 146 n.25. This
lack of attention to antitrust enforcement was due largely to the existence of large
state owned monopolies in a variety of industries. Id. Recently, however, Mexico's
federal legislature enacted additional antitrust measures to streamline the NAFrA
transition and minimize trade disputes. ki. (citing Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento
Industrial, Ley Federal de Competicion Economica, D.O. 9-15 (Dec. 24, 1992)). These
regulations incorporate key provisions of the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission,
Robinson-Patman, and Clayton Acts. Id.
499. The history of antitrust law in Japan began with the enactment of the
Antimonopoly Act, intended to emulate U.S. antitrust law, after World War It. Richard
L. Thurston, Japan-The Antimonopoly Act and Japanese Fair Trade Commnission
Enforcement, 27 INT'L LAW. 533, 534-35 (1993). Subsequent revisions of the Act diluted
its provisions and made many anticompetitive practices, including horizontal and ver-
tical restraints, legal. Id. Antitrust enforcement by the Japanese government was con-
sidered lax. Id. After years of pressure from the West, particularly the United States,
Japan initiated antitrust reform measures, including greater regulatory supervision, en-
forcement, and the issuance of Antimonopoly Guidelines outlining various unfair trade
practices. Id. The reforms, to date, seem to have resulted in tougher antitrust en-
forcement. Id.
500. See Joel Davidow, 7Te Relevance of Antivionopoly Policy for Deoelopi'og Coun-
tries, ANTITRUST BULL., Spring 1992, at 277 (noting adoption of competition legislation
in former socialist countries of Eastern Europe).
501. Garvey, supra note 295, at 490-91. The antitrust cooperation agreement be-
tween the United States and the European Community is a prime example. Under its
framework, members must investigate anticompetitive behavior alleged by the enforce-
ment authorities of the other member to have occurred. E.C.-U.S. Antitrust
Agreement, supra note 437, arts. I, Ill & IV. Moreover, the agreement requires en-
forcement authorities to consider various comity factors in the event policies between
the two members are brought into conflict, thus placing a positive limitation on the
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Finally, even where no cooperative agreement exists and a conflict
between sovereign interests is present, the executive and legislative
branches are fully capable of limiting the prescriptive reach of antitrust
law on their own initiative. For example, in 1982, Congress passed the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, which "exempt[ed] from Unit-
ed States antitrust law conduct that lacks [a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable] domestic effect, even where such conduct originates
in the United States or involves American-owned entities operating
abroad." ' Further, in 1988, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice announced its investigations would consider factors similar to the
Restatement factors."" Such non-judicial mechanisms are the most ap-
propriate means of resolving the serious conflicts between sovereign in-
terests in the antitrust context. Courts simply lack the institutional re-
sources, timing, and skill to solve such politically sensitive problems.'
Courts, however, are not entirely without the ability to dismiss cases
involving foreign interests. The procedural issues discussed in Part II of
this article, judicial jurisdiction" and forum non conveniens, are al-
most always raised in cases involving foreign defendants. These ques-
tions do not engage judges in impractical and unpredictable balancing of
sovereign interests required in the Timberlane/Restatement analysis. By
contrast, they focus on the quantifiable contacts of the parties and
transactions to determine the relative "fairness" or "convenience" in hear-
ing the dispute in the chosen forum.r"7 Rather than being concerned
with the potential impact the assertion of jurisdiction will have on for-
eign relations, judges in these issues are concerned with judicial efficien-
cy and practicality within the interstate and international system. These
are, by themselves, weighty concerns and ones that courts are well able
to undertake because the necessary knowledge and information are with-
in the court's well-established domain. But when judges venture beyond
exercise of jurisdiction. See id. art. VI.
502. Eurim-Pharm GmbII v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For
further commentary on the FTAIA, see supra notes 233-36 & 287 and accompanying
text.
503. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 382417 & 483-94 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 40-109 (in per;son(alf) & notes 130-43 and accompanying text
(quasi in rein).
506. See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 71-76 (fairness factors in persoanm jurisdiction), notes 122-26
(convenience factors in jbitnm non convenicns), & notes 131-36 (fairness in quasi in
rein'm).
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that territory into the battleground of governmental interests, their ef-
forts, though well-intended, do more harm than good.
MICHAEL G. MCKINNON
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